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Institutional investors of all types exhibit substantial home-state bias when investing in private equity
(PE) funds. This effect is particularly pronounced for public pension funds, where the local overweighting
amounts to 9.7% of the private equity portfolio on average, based on 5-year rolling average benchmarks.
Public pension funds’ own-state investments perform significantly worse than their out-of-state investments,
an average of 3-4 percentage points of net IRR per year, and those that that overweight their portfolios
towards home-state investments also perform worse overall. These underperformance patterns are
not evident for other types of institutional investors, such as endowments, foundations and corporate
pension funds, and we do not observe similar overweighting or underperformance of investments in
neighboring states. Overweighting in home state investments by public pension funds is greater in
states with higher levels of corruption, although there is no positive correlation of underperformance
with corruption for these investors. The overweighting and underperformance of local investments
cost public pension funds between $0.9 and $1.2 billion per year, depending on the benchmark.
Yael V. Hochberg















Institutional investor asset allocations and performance have come under increased scrutiny in 
recent years. In particular, public institutional investors have faced greater pressure to disclose 
their private equity fund holdings and performance. Key legal cases, such as the 2002 suit by the 
San Jose Mercury News filed against the California Public Employees' Retirement System 
(CalPERS) to force it to disclose its Private Equity (PE)
1 investments and performance, have 
stirred the public debate over the level of transparency necessary or desirable when public funds 
are invested.  
  A significant and growing literature in financial economics seeks to understand the 
investment decisions and subsequent performance of institutional investors. Institutional 
investors as a group vary substantially from retail investors, but also exhibit systematic 
differences across institutional types in returns and investment strategies (Lerner, Schoar and 
Wongsunwai (2007)). Relatively few empirical papers, however, have considered the asset 
allocation choices of institutional investors, and more specifically, how they choose particular 
investments within asset classes.
2 In this paper, we address this question in the context of PE, 
examining allocations to and performance of limited partner (LP) investments.
 3 Specifically, we 
attempt to quantify the extent and costs of a particular investment bias, the preference for home-
state investments. 
A preference for geographically local equity investing by managers of domestic public 
equity within the U.S. has been documented by Coval and Moskowitz (1999), who show that the 
average U.S. mutual fund manager invests in companies that are physically closer by around 
10% than the average firm that could have been held in the portfolio. In contemporaneous work, 
Brown, Pollet and Weisbenner (2011) document that state pension plans that actively manage 
their own stock portfolios overweight the holdings of stocks of companies that are headquartered 
in-state, suggesting that this sort of home bias is likely relevant for at least some classes of 
institutional investors other than mutual funds. The possibility of home bias in the selection of 
                                                            
1 Throughout this paper, we will use the term ‘private equity’ or ‘PE’ to refer to the general class of private 
investment funds we examine, which includes Buyout, Venture Capital, Real Estate Private Equity, etc. 
2 Notable exceptions include Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001), Baik, Kang and Kim (2009) and Brown, Pollet 
and Weisbenner (2011). 
3 We note that throughout the remainder of this paper, we will interchangeably use the terms ‘institutional investors’ 
and Limited Partners (LPs), as well as the terms ‘PE fund managers’ and General Partners (GPs). 3 
 
PE investments, in particular, is a concern in light of evidence in Lerner, Schoar and 
Wongsunwai (2007) that suggests public pension funds underperform other types of LPs in their 
in-state PE fund investments.  
  To examine institutional investor tendencies towards home-state PE investing, we 
employ an extensive dataset of limited partner (LP) investments in private equity (PE) funds over 
the last 30 years. Combining these data with data on PE fund performance and location, we 
examine institutional investor allocations to home-state and out-of state PE funds, as well as their 
performance on those investments. As we are primarily interested in the location of the GPs—
who receive the fee income from the investment—we focus on the location of the fund GP, 
rather than on where the capital is deployed by the GP.
4  
Our analysis suggests that institutional investors of all types (endowments, foundations, 
public and corporate pension funds) exhibit substantial home bias in their PE portfolios. On 
average, an excess 8.1 percentage points of the investments in institutional PE portfolios are in 
funds headquartered in their own state, relative to a given state’s share in the population of 
investments by out-of-state LPs. For public pension funds, however, this over-allocation to in-
state investment funds is substantially larger. Public pension funds, on average, over-allocate to 
home-state funds by 9.7 percentage points of the investments in their portfolio, measured relative 
to their home state’s share of the population of funds using 5-year rolling periods. In contrast, 
home-state over-allocation by other types of institutional investors averages 3-7 percentage 
points.
5 
  One possibility that would explain this overweighting is that public pension funds may be 
able to make use of local connections, networks and political access to gain better information 
than out-of-state investors on the prospects of funds located in their home-states, or to gain 
                                                            
4 Data on the underlying investments are not available for most of our sample. It is well established that venture 
capital investment are made locally to the fund (Sorenson and Stuart (2001)), and there is some evidence that private 
real estate funds are also geographically specialized (Hochberg and Muhlhofer (2011)). In contrast, we speculate 
that buyout funds and funds in the ‘other’ category are probably less likely to invest locally.  
5 Data on actual dollar value allocations to funds is only available for a little over half of the full sample of 
investments, and coverage on these commitments is particularly poor for the non-public-pension LP classes. In order 
to exploit the full richness of the different types of institutional investors in the sample, our headline results employ 
the full sample and treat the investments as all of equal size, effectively equal-weighting the investments. However, 
we also show that the main results all go through for the categories with sufficient coverage if one focuses only on 
the smaller sample of investments for which the dollar value of the LP commitment is available (calculating 
overweighting as a share of total known commitments and value-weighting all performance regressions by the size 
of the commitment.) 4 
 
access to more and better funds in their home-states. If so, we would expect the in-state 
investments made by local public pension funds to perform better than the investments made in 
their home-state by out-of-state investors who lack such access. We may even observe that the 
in-state investments made by local public pension funds perform better than the investments 
made by these pension funds in out-of-state funds; this appears to be the case for public equity 
investments by state public pension funds, as documented by Brown et al (2011). Furthermore, 
Coval and Moskowitz (2001) find that U.S. mutual fund managers of public equities earn 
abnormal positive returns in their local investments in public equities, primarily due to 
informational advantages. Such informational advantages might be expected to be particularly 
strong in the realm of private equity, an investment setting characterized by substantial 
asymmetric information. 
When we examine the performance of in-state versus out of state private equity 
investments, however, we find that public pension funds perform worse by 5.5 percentage points 
on average on their in-state investments than on the investments they make in out-of-state funds, 
consistent with the findings in Lerner, Schoar and Wongsunwai (2007). Additionally, we find 
that public pension funds’ performance on in-state investments is worse by 3.6 percentage points 
compared to investments made by out-of-state LPs in the public pension fund’s home state. 
Thus, the overweighting of public pension fund portfolios in home-state investments does not 
appear to be due to superior information regarding home-state fund prospects. This contrasts 
with the findings in Brown et al (2011), who find that state pension funds outperform in their in-
state public equity investments. Furthermore, this effect does not appear likely to be related to 
uncertainty aversion due to distance or lack of familiarity (Epstein and Miao (2003)), as there is 
no difference in performance between out-of-state investments made by public pension fund LPs 
in immediately neighboring states and those made in non-neighboring states. 
When we perform a similar analysis for other types of institutional investors, we do not 
observe significant performance differences of these types, suggesting that despite evidence of 
some level of home-state bias in their investment choices, their performance is not adversely 
affected. The overweighting of public pension LPs in poorly performing local investments is 
particularly striking when one considers that risk management incentives should give public 
pension LPs a strong motivation against local concentration. If the performance of local 
investments is correlated with local economic conditions, then declines in the value of these local 5 
 
investments will come exactly at times when state revenues are down and pension funding is 
most costly. 
Why do public pension funds overweight home-state investments with poor 
performance? Home-state investments are often justified in the context of Economically 
Targeted Investment (ETI) programs, so a natural hypothesis is that public pension systems are 
subject to political pressures to invest in their home state. These pressures may be higher in 
states where self-dealing, corruption and quid pro quo activity is more commonplace. To explore 
this hypothesis, we relate overweighting in home-state investments to commonly accepted 
measures of state-level corruption. We find that home-state overweighting by public pension 
funds is indeed higher in states with greater corruption. In contrast, higher state-level corruption 
appears to be unrelated to home bias for public institution endowments and foundations, but is 
associated with lower home-state overweighting for private institution endowments. When we 
relate the performance of in-state investments to state-level corruption, we find that public 
pension fund performance on home-state investments does not decrease in the level of corruption 
(and may in fact increase).
6 However, we find that the performance of in-state investments for 
other types of institutions decreases with increased corruption at the state level.
7  
Our final analysis attempts to quantify the hypothetical cost of such home bias by public 
pension funds. Our calculations suggest that if each public pension LP had performed as well on 
its in-state investments as out-of-state public pension LPs performed on investments in the same 
state, the public pension LPs would have reaped $1.23 billion annually in additional returns. 
However, public pension funds that overweight in-state PE also tend to perform somewhat more 
poorly than other public pension funds when investing out of state. That is, they tend to be 
slightly worse investors overall. As a result, if each public pension LP had performed as well 
(and only as well) on its in-state investments as it did out of state, then the total benefit would 
only be $0.92 billion. Averaged equally across the 50 states, the financial effects of these biases 
represent 0.5-0.6% of the assets in the private equity programs per year and 1.3-1.8% of annual 
contributions to the pension funds. While for some states the costs are quite low, for others such 
                                                            
6 The direction of this effect is consistent with findings for public equity investments by state pension funds in 
Brown et al (2011), who find that the over-performance of in-state public equity investments by state pension funds 
is greater in states with higher levels of corruption. 
7 We also examined the correlation between corruption measures and the governance characteristics of public 
pension systems, including the share of the public pension investment boards that are appointed by government 
officials, but found little in the way of explanatory patterns. 6 
 
as Massachusetts and California they appear high as a share of total PE assets and annual 
contributions. 
A caveat to this cost analysis is that data on actual dollar value allocations to funds is 
only available for a little over half of our sample. In our main calculations, we thus necessarily 
must make some assumptions about the relative portion of the portfolio dedicated to any 
individual fund in our sample, assuming that fund investments are of equal size. As an 
alternative, we have performed value-weighted cost analysis using only the investments for 
which commitment levels are available, and then extrapolating to the rest of the PE portfolio. 
The results are highly robust to considering the relative size of investments in this way, and in 
fact the costs become around 50% larger. However, the selection in disclosure of commitment 
levels in some key states (particularly New York) appears to favor the worse-performing 
investments, suggesting that the equal-weighted cost analysis provides a more accurate picture.  
Notably, our analysis does not address the welfare implications of home-state 
investments by public pension funds. As noted by Lerner, Schoar and Wongsunwai (2007), 
public pension funds may face political pressures to invest in in-state funds in an effort to 
support the local economy even if doing so reduces return on investment. It is possible that 
positive externalities for residents, taxpayers and public sector retirees due to the local economic 
development resulting from these investments may offset the lower returns earned by the public 
pension fund. As such, we cannot say unilaterally that the home bias and underperformance on 
home-state investments documented by our analysis is suboptimal. Rather, we document the 
extent and potential financial effect of the home bias, and leave explorations of net welfare to 
future research. We note that the overweighting and underperformance of public pension funds is 
largest in venture capital and real estate, where, in contrast to leveraged buyouts, positive 
externalities for local economic development are more plausible. 
The contribution of our work is fourfold. First, to the best of our knowledge, this is the 
first study to perform a detailed examination of home bias in LP investments in the PE industry. 
We show that LPs in general, and public pension funds in particular, overweight their 
investments in their home state, and document the costs associated with such bias. Our work is 
thus related more generally to the literature on limited partner (LP) investments in private equity 
funds. Gompers and Lerner (1996) and Lerner and Schoar (2004) examine the contracts entered 
into between investors and funds, and how they are affected by the nature of both the targeted 7 
 
investments and the LPs. Lerner, Schoar and Wongsunwai (2007) explore heterogeneity in the 
returns that different classes of institutional investors earn when investing in private equity and 
suggest that LPs vary in their level of sophistication. Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Vissing-
Jorgensen (2010) model the investment and reinvestment relationship between VC funds and 
their limited partners in a setting with informational holdup. Large open questions remain, 
however, as to the drivers and consequences of the decisions by individual LPs to invest in 
private equity funds, and our work sheds some light on these open issues.
8  
A second and related contribution of our work is to expand upon and shed light on a 
possible contributor to the limited partner performance puzzle documented by Lerner, Schoar 
and Wongsunwai (2007). Lerner, Schoar and Wongsunwai (2007) document that endowments 
earn much higher returns on their PE investments than do other types of institutional investors 
While Lerner et al show that endowment outperformance is not due solely to regional 
investments, our results suggest that the underperformance of local investments is nonetheless an 
important aspect of the relatively poor performance of public pension funds.  
A third contribution is to the literature on the local bias for institutional investors, such as 
French and Poterba (1991), and Coval and Moskowitz (1999, 2001).
9 Closest to our work in 
spirit is contemporaneous work by Brown, Pollet and Weisbenner (2011), who examine public 
equity investments by 20 state pension plans who actively manage their own public equity 
portfolios. In contrast to Brown et al (2011), we focus on all classes of institutional investors, 
and examine PE investments rather than publicly traded stock holdings. While both our analysis 
and that of Brown et al (2011) suggest that public pension funds exhibit substantial home bias in 
their investment choices, and that this home bias is larger in states with higher levels of 
corruption, Brown et al (2011) find that public pension funds outperform on their in-state 
investments, whereas we find that public pensions perform worse on their in-state investments. 
The corruption results of both our paper and the Brown et al (2011) paper suggest that further 
                                                            
8 A large literature, beginning with Kaplan and Schoar (2005), explores the performance of private equity funds and 
investments and the relationship between performance and subsequent fundraising. Notable papers include Jones 
and Rhodes-Kropf (2003), Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003), Cochrane (2005), Korteweg and Sorensen (2010), 
Quigley and Woodward (2003), Gottschalg and Phalippou (2009), and Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Vissing-Jorgensen 
(2010). 
9 Other related work in this includes Strong and Xu (2003), who find that international home bias is a function of 
optimistic attitudes about home country performance, and Graham, Harvey and Huang (2009), who show that local 
bias is correlated with lower self-confidence regarding investment competence.  8 
 
examination of the relationship between pension fund (and state-level) governance and public 
pension investments is warranted.  
 Relatedly, our final contribution is thus to an emerging literature on public pension fund 
governance. Public pension systems are underfunded by $3 trillion (Novy-Marx and Rauh 
(2010)) and operate under an accounting regime that rewards the taking of risks that allow funds 
to assume high expected returns. This might be expected to push funds towards riskier 
investment categories. The relation between public pension fund governance and overall 
performance has been studied by Mitchell and Hsin (1994) and Coronado, Engen, and Knight 
(2003). An important question that we are addressing in ongoing research is the extent to which 
our state level corruption measures are correlated with poor governance features at the level of 
the public pension funds. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our data and 
sample. Section 3 presents the empirical analysis of home bias. Section 4 relates home-bias to 
state-level corruption. Section 5 analyzes the costs of public pension fund home bias. Section 6 
discusses and concludes. 
 
2. Data 
The bulk of institutional investment in private equity is made via distinct, legally separate, funds 
run by professional managers (referred to as the GPs), as the selection of appropriate direct 
investments requires resources and specialized human capital that few institutional investors 
have. PE funds are raised for a specified period (typically a 10-12 year, with possibility for 
shorter extensions) and are governed by partnership agreements between the investors and the 
fund’s principals. The agreement specifies the nature of the fund’s activities, the division of the 
proceeds, and so forth. Private equity groups typically raise a fund every few years.  
To examine the investment patterns and investment performance of LPs, we construct a 
sample of PE fund investments by institutional investors over the period 1980-2009 using data 
obtained from four major sources: Thomson Reuters’ Venture Economics (VE), Private Equity 
Intelligence (Preqin), VentureOne (V1) and Capital IQ (CIQ). None of the four data sources 
provides complete coverage of any given LP's investments, or of the LPs in any given fund, a 
drawback noted by Lerner, Schoar and Wongsunwai (2007), who use VE data in a related 9 
 
exercise, and Hochberg, Ljungqvist and Vissing-Jorgensen (2010), who employ similar data for 
VC funds to test an informational hold-up model. We obtain performance data for the funds, in 
the form of net IRRs and multiples of committed capital, and from Preqin. Data on the location, 
portfolio size and type of institutional investor, as well as information on the location of the PE 
funds are obtained from a combination of the above four sources. 
One drawback of this type of data is that data on the size of the investment, i.e. the 
commitment by the LP to the fund, is generally incomplete. In our sample, the size of the 
commitment is available for roughly half of the observations. For public pensions, the coverage 
is roughly 80%, whereas for the other LP types it is substantially below 50%. In order to exploit 
the richness of the data on different types of investor classes, our headline use the full sample 
and treat the investments as all of equal size, effectively equal-weighting the investments. 
However, we show that the main results all go through for the LP categories with sufficient 
coverage, and are quantitatively quite similar if one focuses only on the smaller sample of 
investments for which the dollar value of the LP commitment is available. That is, we calculate 
overweighting as a share of total known commitments and value-weight all performance 
regressions by the size of the commitment, including only observations for which we actually 
have commitment data. 
            State-level corruption measures are obtained from Glaeser and Saks (2006). Glaeser and 
Saks (2006) derive corruption levels from the Justice Department’s “Report to Congress on the 
Activities and Operations of the Public Integrity Section,” which lists the number of federal, state 
and local public officials convicted of a corruption-related crime by state. They divide these 
convictions by average state population from the 1999 and 2000 Census to obtain an estimate of 
the state corruption rate per capita. Alaska ranks as the most corrupt state in their ranking, 
followed by Mississippi, Louisiana and South Dakota. The least corrupt states in the Glaeser-
Saks ranking are Oregon, Washington, Vermont and Minnesota. We refer to the Glaeser-Saks 
measure as the GS measure. 
Additional measures of state-level corruption are taken from the survey of state 
corruption by Boylan and Long (2003) as covered in the New York Times. The survey by 
Boylan and Long (henceforth BL), completed in 2003, asks state house reporters to assess state 
officials and rank their state in terms of corruption on a scale of 1 (clean) to 7 (crooked). In three 
states, correspondents chose not to respond to the survey. Both the BL survey ranking and the 10 
 
indicator for non-response to the BL survey correlate highly with the GS corruption rate levels.  
We also use data on the public pension funds from a variety of sources. The data on 
whether a public pension fund represents teachers, public safety officials, both, or neither comes 
from the Center for Retirement Research (2006), augmented by additional collection based on 
the name of the pension fund. State level pension contributions and the number of covered 
workers are taken from the dataset of Novy-Marx and Rauh (2010). State revenues are from the 
Annual Survey of State Government Finances (U.S. Census Bureau (2009)). 
As can be seen in Table 1, combining the four private equity data sources and retaining 
only observations with available location data gives us 18,828 investments by 631 unique LPs 
investing in 3,554 PE funds.
10 The top panel of Table 1 shows the number of investments by 
source and investment type. Of these 18,828 observations, roughly 57 percent are present in 
Preqin only, 11 percent are present in both Preqin and VE/V1, 13 percent are present in both 
Preqin and Capital IQ, and 7 percent are present in all three datasets. Thus, Preqin alone would 
cover 89 percent of the investments in our sample. The remaining 11 percent of the sample is 
represented by roughly 2,210 observations, of which 1,024 are present in Capital IQ only, 380 
are in VE/V1 only, and 806 are in both Capital IQ and VE/V1. Thus, Capital IQ alone would 
cover 29 percent of the observations in the sample, and VE/V1 alone would cover around 25 
percent of the observations in the sample. 
The bottom panel of Table 1 shows the investments sample broken down by type of PE 
fund. Thirty percent of the investments are buyout investments, 30 percent are VC investments, 
and 13 percent are real estate. The remaining 27 percent are other types of PE funds, including 
funds of funds, distressed debt, mezzanine, and natural resources investments. As noted, 
throughout this paper, we refer to investments in VC, buyout, real estate, and all other private 
fund type categories as private equity or PE investments. 
Table 2 presents the number of investments by type of LP and by type of investment. 
Investments by public sector pension funds comprise 11,799 observations, or 63 percent of the 
sample. Investments by endowments and foundations each comprise 16 percent of the sample, 
and investments by private sector pension funds make up the remaining 6 percent. Of the public 
sector pension fund investments, 32 percent are in buyout, 26 percent in VC, 16 percent in real 
                                                            
10 For comparison, in their analysis, Lerner, Schoar and Wongsunwai employ a dataset from VE alone comprised of 
4618 investments in 838 funds by 352 LPs.  11 
 
estate and 26 percent in other. Private sector pension funds invest comparatively more in venture 
and buyout, and less in real estate and other categories. 
As can be seen from the table, endowments have a heavier allocation to VC than either 
public or private pension funds, with 40% of endowment investments going towards this 
investment type. Compared to public pensions, endowments invest less in buyout (26 percent of 
investments versus 32 percent) and less in real estate (8 percent of investments compared to 16 
percent). The heavy weighting on VC is particularly apparent in the endowments of private 
institutions, where over half of investments are in VC.  
In contrast, the endowments of public institutions have allocations to VC that are much 
lower than the endowments of public institutions and much more like the public sector pension 
funds. However, public institution endowments have less buyout than any other category and 
more investments in the “other” category. Foundations resemble endowments to some extent, in 
that they have more VC investments than buyout investments, but they also have a larger share 
of investments in the other category than any other LP type. Endowments associated with public 
institutions have allocations to the different fund types that are closer to the allocations of public 
sector pension funds. Private institution endowments have more than half of investments in VC, 
whereas for public sector endowments, the investment is only 28 percent. 
The “other” investments of public pension funds are approximately 25 percent in funds of 
funds. Public sector funds use a wide range of other investments. The other category for public 
pension funds contains 20 percent distressed debt, 14 percent mezzanine, and 10 percent natural 
resources. The other investments of private pension funds are also only about 25 percent in funds 
of funds, with 26 percent of the “other” investments in balanced funds and the rest distributed 
across a number of other categories including distressed debt and mezzanine. The large 
allocation of public institutions to other is 40 percent in funds of funds investments, 19 percent in 
distressed debt, and 16 percent in natural resources.  The distribution within the “other” category 
for foundations is quite similar to that of the public endowments.   
Table 3 presents additional summary statistics for our sample. Panels A presents 
summary statistics for the net IRR returned by funds invested in broken out by institutional 
investor type, for the 14,881 observations for which we have performance data. Funds invested 
in by endowments return a mean (median) net IRR of 12.01% (6.10%), and those invested in by 
foundations return 9.78% (6.30%). PE funds invested in by private sector pension funds return a 12 
 
mean (median) IRR of 8.41% (6.45%), while those invested in by public sector pension funds 
return a mean (median) IRR of 5.78% (5.00%). 
Panel B of Table 3 presents summary statistics for an alternative performance measure, 
the multiple of committed capital returned by PE funds, again broken out by institutional 
investor type.  Funds invested in by endowments return a mean multiple of 1.79x, while those 
invested in by foundations return a mean multiple of 1.66x. PE funds invested in by private 
sector pension funds return a mean multiple of 1.57x, while those invested in by public sector 
pension funds return a mean multiple of 1.36x. 
Panel C of Table 3 breaks out our sample by type of institutional investor and PE fund 
vintage year. Consistent with the growth of the PE sector since the 1980s, the bulk of our sample 
observations are investments by LPs in funds from vintage years in the 1990s (5,519 
investments) or 2000s (12,557 investments), with a smaller proportion of investments made 
during the 1980s.
11 Public pension fund investments represent the largest portion of our sample 
(11,797 investments), followed by endowments (2,958 investments) and foundations (2,953 
investments).  
Panel D of Table 3 presents summary statistics for the size of the institutional investor’s 
portfolio at the end of our sample period, 2009. Pension funds, both private and public sector, 
have the largest portfolio sizes on average, at $1186 million and $1176 million, respectively.  
Finally, Panel E of Table 3 presents summary statistics for state-level variable used in our 
analysis. The mean state in our sample (excluding WY due to lack of WY LPs in our sample and 
excluding DC for the Glaeser-Saks data) has a GS corruption index level of 0.28, a NYT survey 
corruption score of 3.22, and a non-response to NYT survey rate of 0.08. The mean state has a 
population of 6,129,246, where the populations are measured as of 2009. Growth in nominal 
GSP is measured by year from 1980-2009. 
Appendix Table 1 presents the geographical distribution of our sample investments, by 
the state where the fund is headquartered. Perhaps unsurprisingly, given that we focus on the 
broad category of PE funds, the highest proportion of our sample investments are in funds 
headquartered in CA (25.84%), followed by NY (23.37%) and MA (16.9%). Nine states have no 
PE funds in which investments were made in our sample (AK, HI, KS, MS, MT, ND, NV, SD 
                                                            
11 In untabulated results, we find that the results on both overweighting and underperformance are very consistent 
across time periods of the sample. 13 
 
and WV) and hence are not shown. 
In columns (2) and (3) of Appendix Table 1, we separate investments into those made by 
in-state LPs and those made by out-of-state LPs. 15,678 of the 18,828 investments in our sample 
are made by LPs who are not located in the same state as the fund they are investing in. The 
remaining 3,150 investments are made by LPs from the same state as the fund they are investing 
in. We call investments made by LPs from the same state as the fund they are investing in in-
state investments. Of the 3,150 in-state investments, 37.87% of them are California investments, 
17.37% are New York investments, and 12.89% are Massachusetts investments. These 
percentages reflect both the extent of LP private equity portfolios in the state and the tendency of 
these LPs to invest within the state. Appendix Table 2 shows analogous calculations weighted by 
committed capital for observations which committed capital is available. 
 
3. Empirical Analysis of Overweighting and Performance 
We begin our analysis by examining the overweighting of LPs with respect to their local 
geography and pooled across time. We quantify this overweighting by type of LP, finding a 
particularly strong effect among public pension funds, as compared to private sector pension 
funds, endowments, and foundations. We also examine how this effect varies among different 
types of investment: buyout, venture, real estate, and other. We then examine performance 
differences between in-state and out-of-state investments for different types of LPs and funds. 
 
A. Overweighting of In-State PE Investments: Analysis Pooled Over Time 
There are several possible benchmarks for the share of an LP’s PE investments that 
would be expected to be in-state if there were no home state overweighting. In this paper, we 
focus on two benchmarks. The first is the share of all investments that are in the state in question. 
Consider, for example, Minnesota, a state chosen at random. Appendix Table 1 shows that across 
all investments in our sample, 0.79% are investments in funds that are located in Minnesota. The 
first benchmark thus would imply that if Minnesota LP investors behave like the average LP 
investor around the country, only 0.79% of their portfolio over the sample period would be 
expected to be in funds located in Minnesota. We call this benchmark the overall state share. 14 
 
  The drawback of the overall state share is that it will be biased upwards if the state itself 
overweights local investments, and it will be biased downwards if the other states that invest in 
the state particularly overweight their own local investments. To see this, suppose that all the 
states investing in Minnesota had a 10% overweighting of their own funds. Then the Minnesota 
share of those other states should really be divided by 0.9 to reflect the expected portfolio 
without home bias.
  
  The second benchmark we consider is therefore the share of all non in-state investments 
that are investments in the state in question. Appendix Table 1 shows that excluding in-state 
investments, 0.68% of the PE investments in the sample are in Minnesota. The second 
benchmark would imply, therefore, that if Minnesota LP investors had the same geographical 
investment distribution as the average LP investor does in its out-of-state investments over the 
course of the sample period, only 0.68% of their pooled portfolio over the sample period should 
be in Minnesota funds. We call this benchmark the state’s share of all out-of-state investments. 
  We first examine in-state overweighting by LPs, pooling the investment sample across 
time. Column (1) of Table 4 presents the equal-weighted investment share by LPs. In contrast to 
Appendix Tables 1 and 2, which lists investment shares by state of the investment (GP), the state 
listed in Table 4 is the state of the LP investor. Column (2) of Table 4 shows the in-state bias 
relative to the first benchmark, the overall state share, based on the pooled sample. For example, 
for California, this in-state bias is 9.3%, calculated as the 35.1% in-state share of California LPs 
minus the 25.8% share of the PE market that California GPs have nationwide over the sample 
period from Appendix Table 1. Column (3) shows the pooled in-state bias relative to the second 
benchmark, the state’s share of all out-of-state investments. Here the figure for California is 
11.7%, which is the 35.1% in-state share of California LPs minus the 23.4% share of California 
GPs in the total number of investments by LPs outside of California. 
  Consider Minnesota as a further example. If Minnesota LP portfolios employed the same 
geographical investment distribution as the LP average across the country over the course of the 
sample, they would be expected to invest 0.8% of their pooled portfolio in Minnesota 
investments. If Minnesota LP portfolios employed the same geographical investment distribution 
as the LP average across the country for out-of-state investments only, they would be expected to 
invest 0.7% of the portfolio in Minnesota investments. In fact, since Minnesota invests 9.7% of 
the PE portfolio in Minnesota funds, they have an overweighting of 8.9% of the portfolio (=9.7% 15 
 
- 0.8%) relative to the overall state share (the first benchmark) and 9.0% of the portfolio (=9.7% 
- 0.7%) relative to the state’s share of out-of-state investments (the second benchmark). 
  The state with the most overweighting in the pooled sample is Massachusetts. Over 40% 
of the PE investments of LPs located in Massachusetts are in Massachusetts-based PE funds. 
Massachusetts does have more PE investment opportunities than the average state of its size, but 
this is reflected in the fact that among all LPs in our sample, 16.9% of PE investments are in 
Massachusetts and 17.7% of out-of-state investments are in Massachusetts.
12 For Massachusetts 
LPs, however, 41.5% of the PE investments are in funds located in Massachusetts, corresponding 
to an overweighting of 24.6% of the portfolio relative to the overall state share and 23.8% of the 
portfolio relative to the state’s share of all out-of-state investments. 
  After Massachusetts, states with the next largest home bias relative to the state’s overall 
share are Ohio (18.2%), Tennessee (12.5%), Pennsylvania (11.5%), Illinois (11.5%), and Texas 
(11.4%). Including Massachusetts, these are the six states with a local state overweighting of 
more than 10 percent of the portfolio, relative to the state’s overall share. On the second 
benchmark, the state’s share of all out-of-state investments, the states with the next largest home 
bias after Massachusetts are Ohio (18.7%), Tennessee (12.5%), Pennsylvania (12.1%), Illinois 
(11.7%), California (11.7%), and Texas (11.2%). Including Massachusetts, these are the seven 
states with a local state overweighting of more than 10 percent of the portfolio, relative to the 
state’s share of all out-of-state investments. 
  The right columns of Table 4 show a value-weighted version of the analysis for the sub-
sample for which we have information on the size of the LP commitment. This panel table looks 
at the overweighting as a function of total known committed dollars, rather than of the total 
number of investments. We find broadly similar results. Overall, the average equal-weighted 
home-state bias is 3.80% and the average value-weighted home-state bias is 4.09% for the 
pooled sample. 
 
B. Overweighting of In-State PE Investments: 5-Year Rolling Benchmarks 
  If geographical investment patterns change over time, it is useful to examine the home-
                                                            
12 The fact that the state’s share of all out-of-state investments is larger than the state’s overall share indicates that 
Massachusetts PE funds receives a particularly large share of their out-of-state investments from LPs with more 
substantial biases towards their own states. 16 
 
state overweighting on a rolling basis over the several years preceding any given vintage, as 
opposed to over the entire sample. Given the structure of the data and the nature of PE 
investments, we do this relative to the previous five years of investment activity.  
Table 5 presents this analysis in analogous format to Table 4. Here the level of 
calculation is the [LP x Vintage], where only [LP x Vintage] observations for which there is a PE 
investment are included. For each [LP x Vintage], we calculate an excess share of home-state 
investments over the preceding five years, relative to both the overall state share during that time 
period and the state’s share of out-of-state investments during that time period. 
  The results in Table 5 are qualitatively similar to, and in fact stronger, than those 
obtained in Table 4 when pooling the sample investments over time. Here, the state with the 
highest level of overweighting on an equal-weighted basis is Ohio, with a home bias that 
averages 32.4% of its PE portfolio relative to the overall state share in each year and 33.1% share 
relative to the state’s share of all out-of-state investments (both based on the preceding five years 
of investment). After Ohio, the states with the largest home bias based on the rolling five year 
benchmark are Massachusetts (31.7% versus overall state share, 31.0% versus share of out-of-
state investments), Illinois (22.3%, 22.7%), Tennessee (18.9%, 18.9%), Pennsylvania (16.0%, 
16.7%), California (13.2%, 15.2%), Minnesota (13.3%, 13.5%) and Texas (13.1%, 13.0%). In 
all, there are eleven states with a local state overweighting that averages more than 10% of their 
PE portfolio on a rolling five year basis. 
  Analogous to Table 4, the right-hand columns of Table 5 present a value-weighted 
version of the analysis for the subsample for which we have information on the size of the LP 
commitment to the fund. Here, we compute overweighting as a function of the total known 
committed dollars, rather than total number of investments. As was the case for the sample 
pooled over time, we again find broadly similar results to the equal-weighted analysis, with the 
average equal-weighted home-state bias at 6.85% and the average value-weighted home-state 
bias at 7.17%.  
  The next logical question is the extent to which the in-state overweighting is concentrated 
in certain types of LPs, and whether it is concentrated in certain types of investments. Table 6 
addresses this question.  
  The first row of Table 6 shows the mean and standard error of the mean for the in-state 17 
 
investment indicator over all 18,828 observations in the full sample. The second row of Table 6 
shows the same statistics for the 18,102 observations for which funds exist in the state of the LP. 
That is, this sample excludes investments by LPs in states for which there were no PE funds that 
any LP in the sample invested in (AK, HI, KS, MS, MT, ND, NV, SD and WV). The next two 
sets of columns present the excess in-state LP portfolio weighting versus both benchmarks: the 
overall state share and the share of out-of-state investments, calculated for each LP in each 
vintage year based on investments in the preceding 5 year period, and averaged over the sample. 
We observe that here there is a 7.8 percentage point overweighting relative to the overall state 
share, and an 8.1 percentage point overweighting relative to the state’s share of all out-of-state 
investments, both statistically significant at the 1% level. 
  The next panel of Table 6 shows means and associated standard errors by LP type for the 
in-state share and the differences between the in-state investment share and the two benchmarks, 
along with t-tests of statistical significance. Public pension funds overweight in-state investments 
by 9.2 to 9.7 percentage points on average. Endowments overweight in-state investments by 6.7 
percentage points on average. Private sector pension funds overweight in-state investments by 
6.2 to 6.5 percentage points on average. Foundations overweight in-state investments by 3.7 to 
3.8 percentage points on average. The final column of Table 6 shows a statistical test of whether 
each LP type is statistically different from the public pensions, and indeed we see that there is a 
statistically significant difference of 3 to 6 percentage points between public pension LPs and 
other LPs when it comes to this local overweighting. 
  The next sets of statistics in Tables 6 show the means, standard errors, differences, and 
statistical tests by the type of investment (buyout, venture, real estate, or other), and also within 
each investment type by the type of LP investor. Public pensions display a 5.3 to 5.8 percentage 
point home-state overweighting in buyout, a 15 to 15.4 percentage point home-state 
overweighting in venture capital, a 14.9 to 15.6 percentage point home-state overweighting in 
real estate, and a 7.2 to 7.8 percentage point home-state overweighting in the other types of 
investments. It thus appears that public pension funds most overweight in-state venture 
investments and real estate investments, with in-state investments in the “other” category and in 
buyout overweighted to a lesser extent. 
  Within these investment types, there are generally significant differences between the 
extent of public pension overweighting of in-state investments and the extent of overweighting 18 
 
by other types of LPs. In venture capital, the 15.4 percentage point public pension overweighting 
(using the second benchmark) is 10.5 percentage points greater than the overweighting seen in 
private pensions, 6.6 percentage points greater than the overweighting seen in endowments, and 
8.5 percentage points greater than the overweighting seen in foundations. Private pensions, 
endowments, and foundations do still overweight venture capital, but not to nearly as large an 
extent as public pension funds. A similar statement holds for real estate, although private pension 
funds are closer to public pension fund LPs in this category. 
  In buyout, the in-state overweighting by public pension LPs is no greater than the in-state 
overweighting of other types of LP investors. In all cases except foundations, the overweighting 
of in-state buyout relative to out-of-state investments is around 5-6 percentage points. For 
foundations it is around 3 percentage points but there is not a statistically significant difference 
with public pension LPs. In the “other” category of investments, it appears that public and 
private pension LPs do the most in-state overweighting with, with foundations doing 
significantly less. 
  Overall, Table 6 presents a clear picture of substantial overweighting of in-state 
investments, particularly by public pension funds investing in venture capital and real estate, but 
also across the board for other LP types and investment types. In Table 7, we perform similar-
minded tests in regression form; we perform panel regressions in which the dependent variable is 
the LP’s excess share of in-state investments over the previous five years, relative to the 
benchmark representing the share of investments in the state by out-of-state LP’s over the 
preceding five year period. The observation is an LP-year. The independent variables are the 
natural logarithm of the size the LP’s private equity portfolio in dollar terms, the natural 
logarithm of the state population, the growth in nominal gross state product (GSP), and indicator 
variables for LP type (the omitted category is foundations). Standard errors are clustered at the 
LP-state level, and all models include vintage year fixed effects.  
Looking at the estimates from the regression models in Table 7, we observe similar 
patterns to those documented in Table 6. The coefficient on the public pension fund indicator is 
positive and significant, with a magnitude that ranges from 12.2 to 13.1 percent, with no 
significance on the coefficients for other types of investors, suggesting that endowments and 
private pensions do not differ significantly from foundations in their in-state overweighting. For 
the control variables, we observe a significant negative relationship between the size of the LP’s 19 
 
PE portfolio and the extent to which it overweights investments in its home state, and a 
significant and positive relationship between home state population and overweighting. 
 
C. Underperformance of In-State Investments 
We next ask how in-state investments perform relative to out-of-state investments. One 
possibility is that public pension funds are able to make use of local connections, networks and 
political access to gain better information than out-of-state investors on the prospects of funds 
located in their home-states or to gain access to more and better funds in their home-states. If so, 
we would expect the in-state investments made by local public pension funds to perform better 
than the investments made in their home-state by out-of-state investors who lack such access; we 
may even observe that the in-state investments made by local public pension funds to perform 
better than the investments made by these same pension fund managers in out-of-state funds. 
Indeed, Coval and Moskowitz (2001) find that U.S. mutual fund managers of public equities earn 
substantial abnormal positive returns in their local investments in public equities, due to 
informational advantages. Such informational advantages might be expected to be particularly 
strong in the realm of private equity, an investment setting characterized by substantial 
asymmetric information. 
Table 8 shows t-tests of differences in net IRR between in-state and out-of-state 
investments. The left panel analyzes the raw IRR, the middle panel examines the IRR minus the 
mean of all other observations in the same state and vintage year of the investment fund (the 
GP), and the right panel examines the IRR minus the mean of all other observations in the same 
state, vintage and investment type of the investment fund (i.e. buyout, venture capital, etc.). 
Controlling in this fashion for the state, vintage year and type of the fund is analogous to 
including a fixed effect for these factors. This is important as expected return and risk may vary 
over time, by state, and by the type of investment.  
Each set of three rows consists of a row of means, a row of standard deviations, and a 
third row with observation counts and t-statistics. The t-statistic is for the test with null 
hypothesis that the difference between the out-of-state IRRs and the in-state IRRs equals zero. 
The first three rows consider all observations, the next set of three rows considers only public 
pensions, the next set of rows considers only private pensions, and so forth. 20 
 
  The left side of the top panel of the table shows that in terms of raw IRR, out-of-state 
investments outperform in-state investments by 2.73 percentage points, and that the difference is 
statistically significant with a t-statistic of 4.11. The middle of the top panel of the table 
examines the same comparison but with respect to the IRR minus the mean of all other 
investments in the same state and vintage. This is analogous to a regression with state-by-vintage 
fixed effects, and tests whether LPs actually do worse when investing in their home state than 
other investors do when investing in the same state. Here, out-of-state investments outperform 
in-state investments by 2.87 percentage points, and the difference is statistically significant with 
a t-statistic of 5.38. We can further adjust for the investment type of the fund in question, to test 
whether LPs actually do worse when investing in their home state than other investors do when 
investing in the same state, in the same vintage year, and in the same type of fund. We do so in 
the right-most columns of the table. Here, out-of-state state investments outperform in-state 
investments by 2.02 percentage points, and the difference is statistically significant with a t-
statistic of 4.63. So it seems clear that overall, out-of-state investments outperform in-state 
investments. Appendix Table 3 provides value-weighted versions of this analysis, with very 
similar results.
13 
  This pattern appears particularly strongly among investments for which the LP was a 
public pension fund. The second set of three rows shows that the difference in average raw IRR 
is 2.78 percentage points, the difference in average IRR demeaned by state and vintage is 3.75 
percentage points, and the difference in average IRR demeaned by state, vintage and type is 2.60 
percentage points. Thus, we observe a 2.5-4 percentage point underperformance of in-state 
investments by public pension LPs. Similar magnitudes are found in the value-weighted results 
in Appendix Table 3. 
  The panels below the top three investigate this relationship for other LP types. When 
examining raw net IRR, there is at best very weak evidence that there is any underperformance 
of in-state investments. While the direction of the sign is usually the same (in-state investments 
perform worse than out-of-state investments), the magnitudes are smaller and the t-statistics are 
very weak. Public endowments are the closest to showing some underperformance of in-state 
                                                            
13 In particular, in Appendix Table 3 we look at the underperformance of in-state investments where the means are 
weighted by the size of the LP commitment. For some LP types, including private pensions and private endowments 
the joint coverage of net IRR and LP commitment size do result in very small sample sizes. 21 
 
investments, though the t-statistic is only 1.30. When the investments are demeaned by state and 
vintage or state, vintage and investment type, however, any underperformance by non-public 
pension LPs is even less apparent. Although not statistically significant, the level of the 
difference is even occasionally negative for public endowments and foundations. Figure 1 
depicts these performance differences in terms of net IRR minus the state-vintage mean, Figure 2 
in terms of net IRR minus the state-vintage-type mean. Untabulated estimates indicate that even 
considering all LPs who are not public pension funds together, there is still no significant 
performance effect of in-state investments. 
  In sum, Figures 1 and 2 demonstrate that only public pension LPs achieve systematically 
worse performance when investing in their home states, even controlling for the possibility that 
investments in those states just performed poorly overall. Public pension LPs actually do worse 
when investing in their home state than other investors do when investing in the same state, year, 
and investment type. 
   Figure 3 repeats a similar analysis to Figure 1, but for the multiple of invested capital 
instead of the net IRR. The conclusion is the same as in Figure 1. Public pension LPs achieve 
lower multiples of invested capital when investing in their home state than other investors do 
when investing in the same state. Public university endowments are the only other group where 
the underperformance would be of an economically significant magnitude, but the difference is 
not at all statistically significant. 
  Figure 4 shows the relative performance of public pension PE investments in-state versus 
out-of-state by investment type category, with a t-statistic for whether the performance is equal. 
Performance is measured as net IRR minus the mean of all other investments in the same vintage 
and GP state. The figure shows that the underperformance is statistically significant across all 
categories. The magnitude of the underperformance is greatest for venture capital, where the 
difference between in-state and out-of-state investments is 3.4 percentage points. But there is 
clear underperformance of in-state versus out-of-state investments across all the categories.  
  Table 8 and Figures 1-4 indicate that in-state investments by public pension LPs 
underperform the benchmarks. The next set of results examines these results in a regression 
context with clustered standard errors and allowing for control variables. The first and fourth 
columns of Table 9 (Panel A) present regression versions of the results in Table 8. The 
observation is an investment by an LP in a fund, and standard errors are clustered at the level of 22 
 
the LP state. The dependent variable in the first set of columns is the net IRR minus the mean net 
IRR for all investments made in the same state in the same vintage year, and in the second set of 
columns is the net IRR minus the mean net IRR for all investments made in the same state in the 
same vintage year of the same investment type. The estimates in the first and fourth columns of 
Table 9 confirm that in-state investments underperform out-of-state investments by 3.75 net IRR 
points in excess of the mean state-vintage net IRR, and by 2.62 net IRR points in excess of the 
mean state-vintage-type net IRR. These are precisely the results found in Table 8. 
An alternative hypothesis for the observed performance differential is that public pension 
fund LPs are willing to accept lower returns on home-state investments relative to out-of-state 
investments due to greater perceived uncertainty about the quality of investment funds or 
prospects in other states. It is unclear why this argument would apply solely to public pension 
funds and not to other types of institutional investors. Nevertheless, if this argument is valid, one 
would expect that LPs would have greater uncertainty regarding the prospects of more distant 
states than immediately neighboring states; and thus, that we should observe LPs significantly 
overweighting neighboring states (relative to non-neighboring states) and achieving lower 
performance on their investments in neighboring states relative to their performance on 
investments in non-neighboring states.  
In the second and fifth columns of Table 9, we include an indicator variable for whether 
the investment in question was made by the LP in an immediately neighboring state. As can be 
seen from the table, we observe no economically or statistically significant difference between 
public pension fund performance on out-of-state investments made in neighboring states versus 
performance on those out-of-state investments made in non-neighboring states. The coefficients 
on the in-state indicator are virtually unchanged from those in the previous columns. 
Furthermore, in untabulated analysis, we find little evidence of overweighting of neighboring 
states in LP portfolios.
14  
Additionally, we note that precise measures of risk for our PE fund investment sample 
are not available, and thus, that differences in returns may in theory be due to differences in risk 
profiles of investments even within type, state and vintage year. That said, there is little reason to 
believe that such effects would materialize only in the investments made by public pension 
                                                            
14 Specifically, when we examine the weighting of neighboring state investments relative to the second benchmark, 




The third and sixth columns of Table 9 add the excess LP in-state share as well as an 
interaction between the in-state indicator and the excess in-state share. The excess LP in-state 
share is defined as the difference between the LP’s in-state share and the predicted in-state share 
based on the state’s share of all investments that are not in-state investments (the second 
benchmark). The third and sixth columns of Table 9 shows that for each 10 percentage points of 
excess in-state share, the net IRR is 6.8 percentage points worse when adjusting net IRR by the 
state-vintage mean, and 4.2 percentage points worse when adjusting net IRR by the stat-vintage-
type mean. Thus, public sector pension funds who overweight in-state more also appear to be 
associated with worse investment performance overall.
16  
  Panel B repeats the analysis in Panel A, substituting multiple of invested capital as the 
performance measure. While we continue to observe that investments made in-state by the public 
pension fund LP have lower performance, we also observe no significant relationship between 
the excess LP in-state share and the performance of the investment in terms of adjusted multiple 
of invested capital.  
  In sum, public pension funds’ own-state investments perform significantly worse than 
their out-of-state investments, by roughly 3-4 percentage points of net IRR per year, and those 
that that overweight their portfolios towards home-state investments appear to perform 
proportionally worse on their PE investments overall. Among out-of-state investments, there is 
no difference between the performance of investments in neighboring states and the performance 
of investments in non-neighboring states. 
 
4. Why Do Public Pension LPs Overweight Local Investments? 
                                                            
15 In untabulated results, we attempt to evaluate the correlation between the riskiness of the PE investments and their 
in- or out-of state status. Specifically, as an admittedly crude proxy, we calculate the within GP standard deviation 
of returns (net of state-by-vintage-by-type mean) across funds (for GPs who have raised at least 3 funds). We assign 
this GP-level risk measure to each investment made in a fund raised by that GP, and compute the correlation 
between the riskiness of each investment and its in- or out-of-state status. We find a negligible (-0.0018) correlation 
between the measure of riskiness of the investment and whether the investment is located in-state or out-of-state. We 
thank Jules von Binsbergen for this suggestion. 
16 These results are robust to further controlling for the PE fund (GP) size and size squared in all performance 
regressions. As the size of the fund chosen also reflects the choice of the particular investment of the GP within the 
investment type categories, we present our headline results without these controls.    24 
 
Why do public pension funds overweight home-state investments with poor 
performance? Home-state investments are often justified in the context of Economically 
Targeted Investment (ETI) programs, so a natural hypothesis is that public pension systems are 
subject to political pressures to invest in their home state. These pressures may be higher in 
states where self-dealing, corruption and quid pro quo activity is more commonplace. To explore 
this hypothesis, we examine how commonly accepted measures of state-level corruption--as a 
proxy for political pressure--correlate with the public pension fund LP’s decision to overweight 
local investments and also their performance in those investments.
17 According to Glaeser and 
Saks (2003), state-level corruption is higher in less-educated and poorer states and in states with 
greater income inequality, and is unrelated to the size of state government. Thus, the GS 
corruption measures may also capture elements related to the sophistication of the managers of 
the state’s public pension funds.  
  Table 10 relates the excess share of in-state investments by LP (using the second 
benchmark with a 5-year rolling average) to LP and state-level variables, such as the size of the 
LP’s PE portfolio, whether it is a teachers’ or public safety retirement fund, and the population of 
the state, as well as to the various state-level corruption measures: The GS corruption rate, the 
BL corruption survey, and an indicator for BL survey non-response. The upper panel of the table 
relates excess share of in-state investments for public pension funds only to the independent 
variables; the lower panel presents similar regressions for endowments as a whole, public 
institution endowments, private institution endowments, private pensions and foundations.  
  In the upper panel, we begin by relating the excess share of in-state investments to the 
corruption rate (column (1)). Column (2) adds a control for the size of the LP’s portfolio, and 
column (3) adds a control for the state population). In column (4), we replace the GS corruption 
index with the BL survey measure and non-response indicator. In column (5), we include all 
three corruption measures (GS, BL, and BL non-response) as well as portfolio size, state 
population and indicators for whether the public pension fund represents teachers or public 
safety.  
                                                            
17 In unreported results we also examined governance structure at the pension fund level, including the extent of 
elected versus political appointees on the fund boards. We did not observe any strong patterns in the data with 
respect to local overweighting and performance. We note that every public pension fund LP in our sample has at 
least one board member appointed by the state governor. The regressions presented in this paper are robust to the 
inclusion of fund-level board governance variables as controls. 25 
 
  Looking at the models in the panel, it is clear that for public pension funds, higher state-
level corruption is positively correlated with the excess share of in-state investments. The 
coefficient on the corruption index is significant in all models, both economically and 
statistically: a one standard-deviation increase in the corruption index (0.14) implies an increase 
in the excess share of in-state investments of 7-8 percentage points. When we include only the 
BL survey measures, both BL survey and the non-response indicator enter significantly. When 
both the GS index and the BL measures are included, the GS measure is significant at the 1% 
level; the BL survey non-response indicator remains statistically significant but not the BL index 
itself. The explanatory power of the models appears to be moderate, with the R
2 of the most 
comprehensive regression model (column (5)) at 0.20, most of which comes from the corruption 
measures. These results are consistent with recent allegations of pay-to-play schemes involving 
political pressure on public pension fund managers in states including Illinois and New York.  
  In contrast, the lower panel of the table suggests that very different forces are at play for 
other types of institutional investors. In column (1) of the lower panel, we see that corruption is 
negatively and significantly related to the excess share of in-state investments for endowments, 
albeit at a 10% significance level. This effect is larger when we isolate to private institution 
endowments alone (column (3)) and positive but insignificant for public institution endowments, 
private pensions and foundations.  
How then does corruption relate to the performance of in-state investments? In Table 11, 
we regress the performance of an investment on an indicator variable for whether it is an in-state 
investment, the corruption index, the size the LP’s PE portfolio, and interactions between in-state 
and corruption, in-state and portfolio size, and portfolio size and corruption. In columns (1) and 
(2), we isolate out models to investments made by public pension funds; in columns (3) and (4) 
we isolate to investments made only by other types of LPs. In Panel A, the dependent 
performance variable is the net IRR minus the vintage year mean net IRR for investments in that 
state; in Panel B, it is the multiple of invested capital  minus the vintage year mean multiple for 
investments in that state.  
Looking at Panel A, we see little significant relationship between corruption and the 
performance of in-state investments. While the most parsimonious specification (column (1)) 
exhibits a weakly significant positive coefficient on the corruption index, suggesting a possible 
relationship between state-level corruption and the performance of the public pension LP’s 26 
 
investments, this loses significance in the expanded model in column (2). The results in Panel B 
are stronger. Here, in the expanded model (column (2), we see a significant positive relationship 
between the level of the corruption index and the public pension LP’s investment performance; 
we also observe a positive and significant coefficient on the interaction of the corruption index 
with the in-state investment indicator, suggesting that in-state investments made by LPs in states 
with higher levels of corruption return higher multiples of investment capital (though not higher 
IRRs).  
In looking at public equity investments by state pension funds, Brown et al (2011) find 
that state pension funds in more corrupt states overweight their investments in the stock of local 
companies more than those in less corrupt states, and that the difference in performance between 
in-state and out-of-state stock investments is strongest for the state pension plans located in more 
corrupt states. While the in-state public equity investments in Brown et al (2011) outperform out-
of-state investments by the 20 state pension funds they examine, this is in clear contrast to the 
underperformance of in-state private equity investments by public pension funds that we 
document, though the direction of the relationship between corruption and performance is 
positive in both cases. The contrast between the performance patterns and overweighting patterns 
both from our analysis and the analysis in Brown et al (2011) suggests that the relationship 
between governance both investment allocations and performance likely warrants further 
analysis than is possible using the data available to us.  
 
5. Cost of In-State Overweighting and Underperformance by Public Funds 
We now turn to examining how much in-state overweighting and underperformance costs the 
state public pension systems in the study.  In Table 12, we show unadjusted public pension fund 
home-state weighting and performance statistics pooled across years. The first column shows the 
public pension LPs’ in-state share and the second shows the state’s share of all out-of-state 
investments by public pension fund LPs.  As an example, consider the state of Massachusetts, 
one of the highest overweighting states in the sample. In the pooled sample period, 44.2% of 
Massachusetts public pension PE investments are in the state, while 13.7% of all investments by 
non-Massachusetts LPs are in Massachusetts. The middle panel then shows the net IRR for three 
types of investments: (i) LP and GP both in the state; (ii) LP not in the state, GP in the state; (iii) 27 
 
LP in the state, GP not in the state. Keeping with our example, in Massachusetts: (i) the average 
net IRR for investments where both the public pension LP and GP are in Massachusetts is 
2.24%; (ii) the average net IRR when non-Massachusetts public pension LPs invest in 
Massachusetts is 11.33%; and (iii) the average net IRR when Massachusetts public pension LPs 
invest outside of Massachusetts is 10.86%.  
Overall, Table 12 shows that the average LP(in)GP(in) investment returns 0.44% in terms 
of net IRR, the average LP(out)GP(in) investment returns 3.99%, and the average LP(in)GP(out) 
investment returns 5.98%. Thus, in the raw data, the in-state private equity investments by public 
pension LPs yield 5.5 percentage points lower returns annually than their out-of-state 
investments. In other words, the net IRR difference due to overweighting in-state investments, 
assuming that the public pension fund could have achieved the realized returns on their out-of-
state investments with this money if it had been invested out of state, costs 5.5% annually in net 
IRR on average. 
Table 13 builds on Table 12 by calculating the 5-year rolling benchmarks for the in-state 
share, instead of the shares pooled over time that were shown in Table 12. The first two columns 
therefore are a breakdown similar to Table 5 but using only public pensions. This calculation 
only measures overweighting relative to the preceding five years of investment history, rather 
than the entire sample.  
The middle three columns of Table 13 again show the net IRR for the same three types of 
investments as in Table 12, but now relative to the vintage mean. This calculation therefore 
benchmarks the performance not to the average of the entire sample of similar geographical 
investments but rather to the average of similar geographical investments within the same 
vintage. LPs that engage in poor market timing therefore do not appear to underperform as much 
on these measures. Still, in-state public pension investments underperform. The average 
LP(in)GP(in) investment returns -2.33% in terms of net IRR net of the vintage mean, the average 
LP(out)GP(in) investment returns -0.19% relative to the vintage mean, and the average 
LP(in)GP(out) investment returns -0.67% relative to the vintage mean. 
Table 14 shows the financial effects of overweighting and underperformance for public 
pension funds based on the 5-year rolling weight benchmarks and net IRR relative to vintage 
means from Table 13. The left panel uses the investments by out-of-state LPs in the state as a 
benchmark, and the right panel uses the investments by state LPs outside of the state as a 28 
 
benchmark. Predicted and excess shares are based on the 5-year rolling benchmarks shown in 
Table 13. The first column is therefore the IRR difference between home-state investments and 
investments by out-of-state LPs in the state, times the predicted in-state share. The second 
column is the IRR difference between home-state investments and investments by out-of-state 
LPs in the state, multiplied by the excess in-state share. The third column is the sum of the first 
two columns. The right panel presents the analogous calculations for the benchmark of state LP 
investments outside of the state. 
Table 14 shows that if each public pension LP had performed as well on its in-state 
investments as out-of-state public pension LPs performed on investments in the same state, the 
public pension LPs would have reaped $1.23 billion annually in additional returns. However, as 
was seen in Table 9, public pension funds that overweight in-state PE also tend to perform 
somewhat more poorly than other public pension funds when investing out of state. That is, they 
tend to be slightly worse investors overall. As a result, if each public pension LP were to have 
performed as well (and only as well) on its in-state investments as it did out of state, then the 
total annual benefit would only be $0.92 billion.  
A rather substantial share of these costs (on an aggregate dollar basis) come from a small 
number of states. California and Massachusetts comprise over $1 billion of the $1.23 billion 
annual cost in the left panel, and New York an additional $0.2 million. Several states, including 
Colorado, Florida, North Carolina, and Pennsylvania, show no underperformance in-state versus 
out-of-state. New York has the interesting feature that its public pension funds’ out-of-state 
performance is even worse than its in-state performance. If the benchmark is how New York 
public pension funds perform out-of-state, New York appears to benefit from home-state 
investing, even though it performs considerable worse on home-state investments than out-of-
state public pension LPs perform in New York. 
Table 15 shows that despite the concentration of aggregate dollar costs in several states, a 
number of states nonetheless incur negative costs from investing that are a non-trivial share of 
either PE assets under management or as a share of annual contributions to the state’s public 
pension funds. While California and Massachusetts still stand out, other states such as 
Connecticut, Illinois, Maryland, Tennessee, and Texas spend about 1% of contributions each 
year on the loss from performing worse on in-state investments then they would if they invested 
out of state.  29 
 
Note that the differences in net IRRs between Tables 12 and 13 suggests that in many 
cases these costs would be substantially higher if performance were not adjusted for the average 
performance of investments of the same vintage. Indeed, some of the most negative average net 
IRRs appear to have come during vintages where PE overall performed poorly. 
  A caveat to the cost analysis presented here is that, given the incomplete data on actual 
dollar value allocations to funds, we must necessarily make some assumptions about the relative 
portion of the portfolio dedicated to any individual fund in our sample. Thus, for the purpose of 
providing a cost estimate, the calculations in Tables 12 through 15 assume that all fund 
investments are of equal size.  
  As an alternative, we have performed value-weighted cost analysis using only the 
investments for which commitment levels are available, and then extrapolating to the rest of the 
PE portfolio. The results are robust to considering the relative size of investments in this way. 
For most public pension funds there are commitment data on 80-90% of the in-state investments 
for which net IRR is also available. But some states, such as New York, hardly disclose 
commitment levels at all. In New York in particular, the commitment data are only disclosed on 
around 14% of the in-state investments for which net IRR is also available, and those 
investments performed much more poorly than the average New York investment for which the 
commitment is not available. Due to this problem, the total costs appear to be higher using the 
value-weighted cost analysis, on the order of over $2.0-$2.2 billion per year as compared to 
$0.9-1.3 billion. 
  Given that the selection in disclosure of commitment levels seems to favor the worse-
performing investments, we believe that the equal-weighted analysis provides a more accurate 
picture of the costs. Given the overall similarity of the picture using the value-weighted analysis, 
it is clear that the equal-weighted results are not being driven by small investments and are 
robust to considerations of investment size. 
 
6. Conclusion 
Investment biases by individual investors have attracted much scrutiny. Our knowledge of the 
biases and tendencies of institutional investors, in contrast, is more limited. In this paper, we 
examine the allocations and investment choices of institutional investors in the PE market and 30 
 
explore their tendencies to invest in their own state.  
  In contrast to the literature on home bias in mutual funds, our findings that public pension 
LPs underperform on local investments--and particularly so when they overweight those local 
investments--show that in the setting of PE investments by local public pension LPs, any 
informational advantages are overwhelmed by factors that induce local public pension LPs to 
select investments that ultimately perform worse. Our results suggest that the home-state 
overweighting by public pensions may be related to state-level corruption levels, suggesting 
political pressures or dealing may be related to the tendency to invest disproportional amounts in 
local funds. Further exploration of the governance channel is thus warranted.  
  These findings can potentially shed light on some of the previously documented puzzles 
in the private equity market (see, e.g., Lerner, Schoar and Wongsunwai (2007). Our work also 
opens interesting questions and avenues for future research. First and foremost, a caveat to our 
analysis is that we cannot assess the overall welfare impact of the home bias behavior we 
document for public pension funds. Further research that analyzes whether there are any 
potentially positive effects of local private equity investments on overall welfare would be 
useful. A second question is whether the patterns we document for private equity investments 
also generalize to other categories of investment, such as hedge funds, real assets, and outside 
public equity managers. Finally, future research should aim to develop a greater understanding of 






Baik, Bok, Jun-Koo Kang, and Jin-Mo Kim, 2010, “Local Institutional Investors, Information 
Asymmetries, and Equity Returns,” Journal of Financial Economics 97(1), 81-106. 
Boylan, Richard, and Cheryl X. Long, 2003, “Measuring Public Corruption in the American States: A 
Survey of State House Reporters,” State Politics and Policy Quarterly 3(4), 420-438. 
Brown, Jeffrey, Joshua Pollet, and Scott Weisbenner, 2011, “The Investment Behavior of State Pension 
Plans,” University of Illinois Working Paper. 
Center for Retirement Research, 2006. State and Local Pension Data. 
http://crr.bc.edu/images/stories/Frequently_Requested_Data/crr_state_and_local_pension_data.xls 
Coronado, Julia L., Eric M. Engen, and Brian Knight, 2003. Public Funds and Private Capital Markets: 
The Investment Practices and Performance of State and Local Pension Funds.  National Tax Journal 
56(3), 579-594 
Coval, Joshua and Tobias Moskowitz, 1999. Home Bias at Home: Local Equity Preference in Domestic 
Portfolios. Journal of Finance 54(6), 2045-2073. 
Coval, Joshua and Tobis Moskowitz, 2001. The Geography of Investment: Informed Trading and Asset 
Prices. Journal of Political Economy 109(4), 811-841. 
Epstein, Larry G. amd Jianjun Miao, 2003. A Two-person Dynamic Equilibrium under Ambiguity. 
Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 27, 1253-1288. 
French, Kenneth R. and James M. Poterba, 1991. Investor Diversification and International Equity 
Markets. American Economic Review 81, 222-226. 
Glaeser, Edward L. and Raven Saks, 2006. Corruption in America. Journal of Public Economics 90, 
1053-1072.  
Gompers, Paul, and Josh Lerner, 1996. The use of Covenants: An Analysis of Venture Partnership 
Agreements. Journal of Law and Economics 39, 463–498. 
Gottschalg, O., and L. Phalippou, 2009. The Performance of Private Equity Funds. Review of Financial 
Studies 22, 1747-1776. 32 
 
Graham, John R., Campbell Harvey and Hai Huang, 2009. Investor Competence, Trading Frequency, and 
Home Bias. Management Science 55, 1094-1106. 
Hochberg, Yael V., Alexander Ljungqvist and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen, 2010. Informational Hold-up 
and Performance Persistence in Venture Capital. Working paper, Northwestern University.  
Hochberg, Yael V. and Tobias Muhlhofer, 2011. Market Timing and Investment Selection: Evidence 
from Real Estate Investors. Working paper, Northwestern University. 
Jones, C., and M. Rhodes-Kropf, 2003. The Price of Diversifiable Risk in Venture Capital and Private 
Equity. Unpublished working paper, Columbia University. 
Kaplan, Steven N., and Antoinette Schoar, 2005. Private Equity Performance: Returns, Persistence and 
Capital Flows. Journal of Finance 60, 1791–1823. 
Korteweg, A., and M. Sorensen, 2010. Risk and Return Characteristics of Venture Capital-Backed 
Entrepreneurial Companies," Review of Financial Studies, forthcoming. 
Lerner, Josh, and Antoinette Schoar, 2004. The Illiquidity Puzzle: Theory and Evidence from Private 
Equity. Journal of Financial Economics 72, 3–40. 
Lerner, Josh, Antoinette Schoar and Wan Wongsunwai, 2007. Smart Institutions, Foolish Choices: The 
Limited Partner Performance Puzzle. Journal of Finance 62, 731-764. 
Ljungqvist, A., and M. Richardson, 2003. The Cash Flow, Return, and Risk Characteristics of Private 
Equity. NBER Working Paper No. 9454. 
Marsh, Bill, 2008. Illinois is Trying. It Really Is. But the Most Corrupt State is Actually. New York Times, 
13 December 2008. http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/14/weekinreview/14marsh.html 
Mitchell, Olivia and Ping-Lung Hsin, 1997. Public Sector Pension Governance and Performance. In 
Salvador Valdes Prieto, ed. The Economics of Pensions: Principles, Policies, and International 
Experience. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 92-126 
Novy-Marx, Robert, and Joshua Rauh, 2010. Public Pension Liabilities: How Big Are They and What 
Are They Worth? Journal of Finance, forthcoming. 
Quigley, J., and S. Woodward, 2003. An Index for Venture Capital. Unpublished working paper, 
University of California, Berkeley. 33 
 
Sorenson, Olav and Toby E. Stuart, 2001. Syndication Networks and the Spatial Distribution of Venture 
Capital Investments. The American Journal of Sociology 106, 1546-1588. 
Strong, Norman and Xinzhong Xu, 2003. Understanding the Equity Home-Bias: Evidence from Survey 
Data.  Review of Economics and Statistics, 85, 307-312. 
U.S. Census Bureau, 2009. 2009 Annual Survey of State Government Finances, 
http://www.census.gov/govs/state/. 34 
 
Table 1: Number of Investments by Source and Type 
The top panel shows the number of investments by source and investment type. The bottom panel shows 
investments by type. 
 
Source     Investments   Share
Preqin Only               10,789   57%
VE/V1 Only                     380   2%
Capital IQ Only                 1,024   5%
Preqin and VE/V1                 2,159   11%
Preqin and Capital IQ                 2,393   13%
VE/V1 and Capital IQ                     806   4%
Preqin, VE/V1, and Capital IQ                    1,277   7%
Total               18,828   100%
Type     Investments  Share
Buyout                 5,682   30%
Venture Capital                 5,562   30%
General           3,329  
Early Stage           1,805  
Late Stage               373  
Venture Debt                 55  
Real Estate                 2,489   13%
Other                 5,095   27%
Fund of Funds           1,508  
Distressed Debt           1,000  
Mezzanine               630  
Natural Resources               579  
Balanced               422  
Secondaries               320  
Expansion               195  
Infrastructure               153  
   Other               288        




Table 2: Number of Investments by Investment Type and Limited Partner (LP) Type 
The table presents the number of investments by type of LP and by type of investment. Percentages represent the percent of the total investments by the LP type 
in each row. 
 
Limited Partner (LP) Type     Buyout     Venture     Real Estate     Other     Total    
Public Sector Pension Fund           3,773           3,020              1,894            3,112             11,799 
32% 26% 16% 26% 100%
Private Sector Pension Fund              425              391                    87               202                1,105 
38% 35% 8% 18% 100%
Endowment              769           1,180                  237               776                2,962 
26% 40% 8% 26% 100%
Private Institution  462  781  59  222       1,524 
30% 51% 4% 15% 100%
Public Institution  307  399  178  554       1,438 
21% 28% 12% 39% 100%
Foundation              715              971                  271            1,005                2,962 
24% 33% 9% 34% 100%
                                      
Total           5,682           5,562              2,489            5,095             18,828 
30% 30% 13% 27%
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Table 3: Summary Statistics 
The first two panels show summary statistics for the key performance measures, net IRR and multiple of invested 
capital, by LP type. The third panel shows the distribution of vintages by decade and LP type. The fourth panel 
shows the size of LP’s private equity (PE) portfolios in 2009. The fifth panel tabulates state-level variables. 
Panel A: Net IRR 
Mean  Median  Std Dev  N 
Endowment  12.01  6.10  35.73  2,268 
Foundation  9.78  6.30  29.30  2,126 
Private Sector Pension Fund  8.41  6.45  24.50  910 
Public Sector Pension Fund  5.78  5.00  29.33  9,577 
All  7.46  5.40  30.22  14,881 
Panel B: Multiple (x) 
Mean  Median  Std Dev  N 
Endowment  1.79  1.18  2.90  2,532 
Foundation  1.66  1.19  2.80  2,371 
Private Sector Pension Fund  1.57  1.25  1.93  978 
Public Sector Pension Fund  1.36  1.09  1.44  11,091 
All 
Panel C: Vintage 
1969-1979  1980-1989  1990-1999  2000-2010 
Endowment  2  95  1,017  1,844 
Foundation  0  63  826  2,064 
Private Sector Pension Fund  0  75  420  608 
Public Sector Pension Fund  7  493  3,256  8,041 
Total  9  726  5,519  12,557 
Panel D: Size of LP's PE Portfolio in 2009, $M, LP Level 
Mean  Median  Std Dev  N 
Endowment  281  81  649  168 
Foundation  153  33  564  193 
Private Sector Pension Fund  1186  317  2595  84 
Public Sector Pension Fund  1176  158  3054  186 
Total  626  89  2017  631 
Panel E: State Variables 
Mean  Median  Std Dev  N 
Corruption Index (Glaeser-Saks)  0.28  0.25  0.14  49 
Corruption Survey (Boylan-Long)  3.22  3.49  1.46  50 
Corruption Boylan-Long Non-Response  0.08  0.00  0.27  50 
Population  6,129,246  4,403,095  6,803,777  50 
Ln(Population)  15.14  15.30  1.02  50 
Growth in Nominal GSP (varies by year)  0.060  0.057  0.041  1500 
WY excluded because no LPs in sample. DC included in all but Glaeser-Saks (no data). DC included in Boylan-
Long non-response. 
 
  Panel F: Investment Variables 
Mean Median  Std  Dev  N 
Commitment Size ($M)  46  20  84  10,833 37 
 
Table 4: Overweighting by LPs of In-State Investments, Pooled Across Time 
The table presents the share of in-state investments by LPs located in each state and the equal-weighted and valued-
weighted home bias of the portfolios of LPs located in each state. Column (1) is the percentage of in-state 
investments made by LPs that are located in the state. Column (2) presents the overweighting relative to all 
investments, calculated as the percent of in-state investments in column (1) of this table minus the state’s share of all 
investments by all LPs in the full sample (pooled over time). Column (3) presents the overweighting relative to all 
out-of-state investments, calculated as the percent of in-state investments in column (1) of this table minus the 
state’s share of all investments by out-of-state LPs in the full sample (also pooled over time). Columns (4), (5) and 
(6) repeat the exercises in columns (2), (3) and (4), value-weighting the investments by the dollar value of capital 
committed to the fund by the LP, and including only investments for which the capital committed by the LP is 
known. WY has no LPs in our sample. Nine states without PE investments are not shown: AK, HI, KS, MS, MT, 
ND, NV, SD, and WV. For three states (AL, AR, and NM), we have no investments with known commitment 
amount data.  
 
Equal Weighted  Value Weighted 
Investments 
by LPs 
Home Bias, % of 
Portfolio, Relative to 
Investments 
by LPs 
Home Bias, % of 
Portfolio, Relative to 
% in state  All LPs 
Out-of-State 
LPs  % in state  All LPs  Out-of-State LP
State(LP) (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
AL 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
AR 2.9% 2.9% 2.9%
AZ 1.0% 1.0% 1.0% 0.6% 0.6% 0.6%
CA 35.1% 9.3% 11.7% 25.0% 5.3% 10.2%
CO 7.9% 6.9% 6.9% 4.5% 3.9% 3.9%
CT 10.4% 3.5% 2.3% 28.7% 22.9% 22.6%
DC 3.6% 2.1% 1.8% 22.1% 18.9% 18.5%
DE 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
FL 0.7% 0.0% -0.1% 0.1% -0.2% -0.2%
GA 2.5% 2.3% 2.3% 0.0% -0.1% -0.1%
IA 0.9% 0.9% 0.9% 0.2% 0.1% 0.1%
ID 3.1% 3.1% 3.1% 1.3% 1.3% 1.3%
IL 18.7% 11.5% 11.8% 21.8% 17.3% 17.4%
IN 5.2% 5.0% 5.1% 0.8% 0.7% 0.8%
KY 3.3% 3.3% 3.3% 0.9% 0.9% 0.9%
LA 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% 0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
MA 41.5% 24.6% 23.8% 26.3% 16.1% 15.1%
MD 3.3% 2.4% 2.3% 2.7% 2.2% 2.1%
ME 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
MI 1.4% 1.1% 1.1% 0.9% 0.7% 0.7%
MN 9.7% 8.9% 9.0% 8.6% 7.1% 7.2%
MO 2.3% 2.2% 2.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.3%
NC 6.9% 6.4% 6.5% 7.2% 6.8% 6.9%
NE 8.0% 8.0% 8.0% 3.1% 3.0% 3.0%
NH 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0% 2.0%
NJ 2.8% 1.4% 1.2% 2.8% 1.6% 1.5%
NM 1.3% 1.3% 1.3%
NY 28.0% 4.6% 3.4% 40.0% 1.9% -2.0%
OH 19.8% 18.2% 18.7% 7.3% 6.7% 6.9%
OK 0.0% -0.1% -0.2% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
OR 2.2% 2.0% 2.1% 0.5% 0.3% 0.3%
PA 13.2% 11.5% 12.1% 8.7% 7.1% 7.7%38 
 
RI 8.6% 7.8% 7.7% 9.7% 8.2% 8.1%
SC 3.6% 3.6% 3.6% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4%
TN 12.8% 12.5% 12.5% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
TX 17.2% 11.4% 11.2% 14.2% 5.6% 5.5%
UT 2.9% 2.9% 2.9% 6.5% 6.5% 6.5%
VA 2.0% 1.3% 1.3% 3.7% 3.1% 3.1%
VT 0.0% 0.0% -0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
WA 4.6% 3.8% 3.7% 1.2% 0.9% 1.0%
WI  3.8%   3.7% 3.8% 2.1%   2.0% 2.1%
Mean 5.76% 3.80% 3.80% 6.72% 4.09% 4.09%




Table 5: Overweighting by LPs of In-State Investments, Rolling 5-Year Benchmarks 
The table presents the equal-weighted and valued-weighted home bias of the portfolios of LPs located in each state 
using rolling 5-year benchmarks. Column (1) is the number of [LP x vintage] observations in which PE investments 
were made, which constitutes the number of observations used in the equal-weighted calculation. Column (2) 
presents the overweighting relative to all investments, calculated as the average percent of in-state investments 
minus the state’s share of all investments by all LPs in the full sample over the preceding five years. Column (3) 
presents the overweighting relative to all out-of-state investments, calculated as the mean over the sample period of 
the percent of in-state investments in each year minus the state’s share of all investments by out-of-state LPs in the 
full sample over the preceding five years. Column (4) is the number of [LP x vintage] observations used in the 
value-weighted calculation, which is the subset of column (1) for which commitment data are available. Columns 
(5) and (6) repeat the exercises in columns (2) and (3), value-weighting the investments by the dollar value of capital 
committed to the fund by the LP, and including only investments for which the capital committed by the LP is 
known. WY has no LPs in our sample. Nine states without PE investments are not shown: AK, HI, KS, MS, MT, 
ND, NV, SD, and WV. For three states (AL, AR, and NM), we have no investments with known commitment 
amount data.  
 
Equal Weighted  Value Weighted 
Observation 
Count 
Home Bias, % of 
Portfolio, Relative to 
Observation 
Count 
Home Bias, % of 
Portfolio, Relative to 
LP x Vintage  All LPs 
Out-of-State 
LPs  LP x Vintage  All LPs 
Out-of-State 
LPs 
State (LP)  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
AL 2 0.0% 0.0%
AR 12 4.8% 4.8%
AZ 30 1.8% 1.8% 21 5.7% 5.7%
CA 548 13.2% 15.2% 339 13.5% 18.5%
CO 124 10.3% 10.4% 88 8.9% 9.1%
CT 97 3.5% 2.2% 34 14.1% 13.9%
DC 63 0.5% 0.2% 5 1.6% 1.2%
DE 18 0.0% 0.0% 10 0.0% 0.0%
FL 53 0.6% 0.5% 23 -0.1% -0.1%
GA 52 2.2% 2.2% 6 -0.1% -0.1%
IA 53 1.5% 1.6% 39 0.4% 0.4%
ID 26 2.3% 2.3% 26 0.6% 0.6%
IL 322 22.3% 22.7% 171 24.3% 24.5%
IN 83 9.8% 9.9% 38 4.2% 4.2%
KY 37 7.6% 7.6% 31 8.0% 8.0%
LA 47 3.6% 3.6% 39 2.9% 2.9%
MA 394 31.7% 31.0% 143 36.1% 35.0%
MD 106 3.4% 3.3% 48 4.6% 4.5%
ME 19 0.0% 0.0% 3 0.0% 0.0%
MI 213 1.0% 1.0% 78 0.1% 0.1%
MN 126 13.3% 13.5% 53 8.3% 8.3%
MO 96 4.3% 4.3% 41 1.2% 1.2%
NC 95 10.6% 10.7% 28 4.3% 4.3%
NE 20 4.3% 4.4% 14 18.1% 18.1%
NH 35 1.6% 1.6% 22 2.2% 2.2%
NJ 52 2.7% 2.5% 15 -0.3% -0.4%
NM 19 7.9% 7.9%
NY 553 5.2% 3.8% 61 -1.2% -5.6%
OH 180 32.4% 33.1% 127 32.4% 32.9%
OK 24 -0.1% -0.2% 14 0.0% -0.1%40 
 
OR 66 3.1% 3.1% 41 5.6% 5.6%
PA 219 16.0% 16.7% 76 27.5% 28.3%
RI 35 12.3% 12.2% 20 11.4% 11.3%
SC 12 0.9% 0.9% 5 0.6% 0.6%
TN 30 18.9% 18.9% 5 0.0% 0.0%
TX 236 13.1% 13.0% 163 14.1% 14.3%
UT 25 6.7% 6.7% 7 16.8% 16.8%
VA 72 0.2% 0.1% 34 1.3% 1.3%
VT 21 -0.1% -0.1% 15 0.0% -0.1%
WA 113 4.0% 4.1% 60 4.9% 5.1%
WI     98   4.0% 4.1%   54   0.7% 0.7%
Total 4,426 1,997
Mean 6.85% 6.86% 7.17% 7.20%




Table 6: In-State Overweighting Overall, by LP Type, and by Investment Type 
The table presents overweighting of in-state investments, overall and by LP type, where the LP’s in-state overweighting each year is calculated versus 
benchmarks based on the prior five years of investments. The first row shows statistics for the in-state investment indicator over all observations. The second row 
shows statistics for the 18,102 observations for which funds exist in the state of the LP (that is, without the 9 states that are excluded from Tables 4 and 5), 
including the expected in-state investment share based on the overall state share in the distribution. 
In-State Investments
Excess over Baseline 1: 
Share of Investments in 
State by All LPs 
Excess over Baseline 2: 
Share of Investments in 




Sample  N  mean  std err  mean  std err  mean  std err 
All 18,828 0.1673 0.003
Excluding Nine States 
without PE Funds  18,102 0.1740 0.003 0.0776 0.003***  0.0807 0.003*** 
By LP Type 
Public Sector Pension  11,174 0.194 0.004 0.092 0.004***  0.097 0.004*** 
Private Sector Pension  1,105 0.176 0.011 0.065 0.011***  0.062 0.011***  -0.036** 
Endowment 2,933 0.129 0.006 0.067 0.006***  0.067 0.006***  -0.030*** 
   Public Institution  1,410 0.080 0.007 0.062 0.007***  0.063 0.007***  -0.034*** 
   Private Institution  1,523 0.174 0.010 0.072 0.009*** 0.070 0.009***  -0.027** 
Foundation 2,890 0.140 0.006 0.037 0.006***  0.038 0.006***  -0.060*** 
By Investment Type 
Buyout 5,241 0.150 0.005 0.051 0.005***  0.054 0.005*** 
Public Pension  3,361 0.139 0.006 0.053 0.006***  0.058 0.006*** 
Private Pension  422 0.230 0.021 0.053 0.018***  0.052 0.018***  -0.006
Endowment 754 0.138 0.013 0.062 0.012*** 0.062 0.012***  0.004
Foundation 704 0.165 0.014 0.028 0.013** 0.031 0.013**  -0.027
Venture 5,331 0.239 0.006 0.115 0.005***  0.116 0.005*** 
Public Pension  2,801 0.320 0.009 0.150 0.008***  0.154 0.008*** 
Private Pension  391 0.113 0.016 0.051 0.013***  0.049 0.013***  -0.105*** 
Endowment 1,177 0.164 0.011 0.088 0.010***  0.088 0.010*** -0.066*** 
Foundation 962 0.146 0.011 0.068 0.009***  0.069 0.009***  -0.085*** 
Real Estate  1,787 0.252 0.010 0.127 0.010***  0.132 0.010*** 
Public Pension  1,399 0.274 0.012 0.149 0.011***  0.156 0.012*** 
Private Pension  63 0.286 0.057 0.110 0.052**  0.105 0.052**  -0.051
Endowment 97 0.113 0.032 0.048 0.030 0.048 0.031 -0.108** 42 
 
Foundation 228 0.162 0.024 0.028 0.024 0.028 0.024 -0.128*** 
Other 4,500 0.143 0.005 0.061 0.005***  0.065 0.005*** 
Public Pension  2,718 0.157 0.007 0.072 0.007***  0.078 0.007*** 
Private Pension  194 0.180 0.028 0.069 0.024***  0.067 0.024***  -0.011
Endowment 686 0.102 0.012 0.058 0.011*** 0.059 0.011***  -0.019
Foundation 902 0.124 0.011 0.028 0.010***  0.030 0.010***  -0.048*** 
By Time Period 
1980s 694 0.216 0.016 0.125 0.015***  0.125 0.015*** 
1990s 5006 0.187 0.006 0.097 0.005***  0.098 0.005*** 
2000s 11,694 0.173 0.004 0.113 0.003***  0.117 0.003*** 
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Table 7: Overweighting of In-State Investments and General LP Characteristics 
The table presents regressions in which the dependent variable is the LP’s excess share of in-state investments over the 
previous 5 years, relative to the benchmark representing the share of investments in the state by out-of-state LP’s over the 
preceding five year period. The observation is an LP-year. The independent variables are the natural logarithm of the size the 
LP’s private equity portfolio in dollar terms, the natural logarithm of the state population, the growth in nominal gross state 
product (GSP), and indicator variables for LP type (the omitted category is foundations). Standard errors are clustered at the 
LP-state level. All models include vintage year fixed effects. *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * 
significant at the 10% level. 
 
Dependent Variable: Excess Share of In-State Investments by LP 
ln(Size of PE Portfolio)  -0.027***  -0.029***  -0.030*** 
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
ln(Population of State)  0.031***  0.030*** 
(0.01) (0.01)
Growth in Nominal GSP  -0.109
(0.23)
Endowment 0.009 0.019 0.015
(0.24) (0.02) (0.02)
Public  Pension  0.122*** 0.131*** 0.131*** 
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Private Pension  0.033 0.039 0.035
(0.31) (0.03) (0.18)
Observations 4407 4407 4244




Table 8: Net IRR Differences 
This table shows t-tests of differences in net IRR between in-state and out-of-state investments. The left panel analyzes the raw IRR, the middle panel examines the IRR 
minus the mean of all other observations in the same state and vintage of the investment fund (the GP), and the right panel examines the IRR minus the mean of all other 
observations in the same state, vintage and investment type of the investment fund (buyout, venture, real estate, other). Each set of three rows consists of a row of means, 
a row of standard deviations, and a third row with observation counts and t-statistics. The t-statistic is for the test with null hypothesis that the difference between the out-
of-state IRRs and the in-state IRRs equals zero. The first three rows consider all observations, the next set of three rows considers only public pensions, the next set of 
rows considers only private pensions, and so forth. *** significant at the 1% level. 
 
IRR  IRR Minus [State x Vintage] Mean IRR Minus [State x Vintage x Type]
Out of State  In State  Difference  Out of State  In State  Difference  Out of State  In State  Difference 
All 7.92 5.19 2.73 0.48 -2.39 2.87 0.34 -1.68 2.02
0.28 0.54 0.66 0.22 0.47 0.53 0.18 0.37 0.44
12,400 2,481 4.11*** 12400 2481 5.38*** 12400 2481 4.63*** 
Public Pension  6.29 3.51 2.78 -0.05 -3.80 3.75 -0.02 -2.62 2.60
0.34 0.66 0.77 0.27 0.60 0.63 0.22 0.46 0.20
7825 1752 3.59*** 7825 1752 5.97*** 7825 1752 13.24*** 
Private Pension  8.58 7.63 0.94 -1.77 -3.54 1.77 -0.96 -1.93 0.96
0.90 1.85 2.15 0.75 1.41 1.77 0.63 1.21 1.48
753 157 0.44   753 157 1.00   753 157 0.65  
Endowment 12.16 10.95 1.22 2.39 1.76 0.63 1.57 0.65 0.92
0.82 1.66 2.26 0.65 1.21 1.77 0.54 0.95 1.48
1982 286 0.54   1982 286 0.35   1982 286 0.63  
Public Endowment  8.08 3.31 4.77 1.06 1.66 -0.60 0.77 -0.86 1.62
1.04 2.01 3.68 0.83 1.69 2.92 0.69 1.10 2.44
1021 84 1.30   1021 84 -0.20   1021 84 0.66  
Private Endowment  16.50 14.13 2.38 3.80 1.80 2.00 2.43 1.27 1.16
1.28 2.16 2.96 1.01 1.57 2.33 0.85 1.26 1.93
961 202 0.80   961 202 0.86   961 202 0.60  
Foundation 10.00 8.40 1.60 1.59 2.70 -1.11 1.04 1.84 -0.80
0.70 1.38 1.86 0.57 1.04 1.49 0.47 0.92 1.24
1840 286 0.86   1840 286 -0.74   1840 286 -0.65  
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Table 9: Excess Share and Performance for Public Sector Pension Funds 
This table examines the relation between whether an investment is in-state and performance. The level of observation is an investment. The variable In-State is an 
indicator for whether the investment is in-state. The variable In Neighbor State is an indicator for whether the investment is in a neighboring state. The variable Excess LP 
In-State Share is the difference between the LP’s in-state share and the predicted in-state share based on the second benchmark (the state’s share of all investments that are 
not in-state investments over the preceding five year period). The first three columns examine performance measures adjusted by the mean performance for all 
investments in the sample that are made in the same state and vintage, the second three columns examine performance measures adjusted by the mean performance for all 
investments in the sample that are made in the same state and vintage and investment type (buyout, venture, real estate, other). In Panel A, the performance measure is net 
IRR. In Panel B, the performance measure is multiple of invested capital. Standard errors are clustered by LP state. *** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 
5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
Panel A: Net IRR 
      Net IRR – [State x Vintage] Mean    Net IRR – [State x Vintage x Fund Type] Mean 
In-State -3.750***  -3.718***  -3.558***  -2.602**  -2.540**  -1.967*** 
(1.070) (1.037) (0.800) (1.180) (1.142) (0.514)
In Neighbor State  0.330 0.556 0.615 0.711
(0.975) (1.002) (0.707) (0.750)
Excess LP In-State Share  -6.830**    -4.223* 
(2.781)   (2.189)
In-State x Excess LP Share  4.611   0.724
(5.600)   (4.912)
Constant -0.048 -0.083 0.322 -0.015 -0.078 0.164
(0.370) (0.405) (0.490) (0.220) (0.234) (0.291)
 
Observations 9577 9577 9051 9577 9577 9051
  
Panel B: Multiple of Invested Capital 
Multiple – [State x Vintage] Mean    Multiple – [State x Vintage x Fund Type] Mean 
In-State -0.085*  -0.085*  -0.159**  -0.074*  -0.073*  -0.105** 
(0.050) 0.048 (0.078) (0.040) (0.041) (0.053)
In Neighbor State  0.002 0.006 0.017 0.017
0.052 (0.055) (0.031) (0.033)
Excess LP In-State Share  -0.017   0.014
(0.179)   (0.123)
In-State x Excess LP Share  0.338   0.121
(0.276)   (0.263)
Constant -0.053***  -0.053***  -0.054***  -0.033***  -0.035***  -0.039** 
(0.020) 0.019 (0.020) (0.010) 0.012 (0.016)
 
Observations 11091 11091 10483 11091 11091 1048346 
 
Table 10: Size, Corruption, and Home-State Overweighting 
The dependent variable is the difference between the LP’s in-state share over the preceding five year period and the 
predicted in-state share based on the second five-year rolling benchmark (the state’s share of all investments that are 
not in-state investments over the preceding five year period). The level of observation is an LP-year. The corruption 
index is from Glaeser and Saks (2006). The Corruption BL Survey is based on Boylan and Long as reported in the 
New York Times by Marsh (2008). The BL Non-Response variable is a corruption indicator for whether no state 
house reporters responded to the corruption survey. Teachers is an indicator for whether the pension system 
represents at least some teachers, and public safety is an indicator for whether the pension system represents at least 
some public safety officials. All models include vintage year fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered by LP-state. 
*** significant at the 1% level, ** significant at the 5% level, * significant at the 10% level. 
 
Dependent Variable: Excess Share of In-State Investments by LP 
Public Pension Funds Only 
Corruption Index  0.547***  0.573***  0.526***  0.550*** 
(0.18) (0.17) (0.19) (0.20)
ln(Size of PE Portfolio)  -0.033**  -0.034**  -0.019*  -0.022
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
ln(Population of State)  0.023 0.047*  0.037
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Corruption BL Survey  0.049**  0.005
(0.02) (0.03)




Public Safety  -0.002
(0.03)
Observations 1930 1923 1923 1923 1923
R-Squared 0.09 0.14 0.15 0.17 0.20










Corruption Index  -0.366*  0.073 -0.704**  -0.214 -0.361
(0.22) (0.19) (0.28) (0.17) (0.30)
ln(Size of PE Portfolio)  -0.023***  -0.014 -0.281***  -0.013 -0.038*** 
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
ln(Population of State)  0.066***  0.033 0.083***  0.005 0.063* 
(0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03)
Observations 989 398 591 425 1007




Table 11: State Corruption and Performance for Different Types of LPs 
The dependent variables are the performance measures: Net IRR demeaned by state-vintage cell in Panel A, and 
Multiple of Invested Capital demeaned by state-vintage cell in Panel B. The corruption index is from Glaeser and 
Saks (2006). 
 
Panel A: Dependent Variable = Net IRR Minus State x Vintage Mean 
  Public Pension Funds Only  All Other LPs 
In-State -5.95  -9.61  3.78  5.28 
 (2.45)**  (6.47)  (2.89)  (4.81) 
Corruption Index  6.28  25.82  2.48  11.36 
  (3.26)*  (17.64) (3.59) (11.17) 
Corruption x In-State Investment  7.35  7.63  -13.23  -13.90 
  (6.62)  (5.97) (6.61)* (6.29)** 
ln(size of LP's PE portfolio)    0.62    0.77 
   (0.64)    (0.51) 
ln(size) x In-State    0.49    -0.21 
   (0.69)    (0.81) 
ln(size) x Corruption Index    -2.67    -1.50 
   (2.49)    (2.30) 
Constant -1.75  -6.30  0.70  -3.91 
 (0.86)**  (4.82)  (1.26)  (2.90) 
R
2 0.01  0.01  0.00  0.00 
N  9564 9561  5251  5251 
 
Panel B: Dependent Variable = Multiple  Minus State x Vintage Mean 
    Public Pension Funds Only  All Other LPs  
In-State -0.24  -0.27  0.58  0.46 
 (0.07)***  (0.10)**  (0.29)*  (0.27)* 
Corruption Index  0.24  1.38  0.02  0.17 
 (0.15)  (0.61)**  (0.31)  (0.85) 
Corruption x In-State Investment  0.53  0.54  -1.52  -1.50 
 (0.20)**  (0.24)**  (0.70)**  (0.70)** 
ln(size of LP's PE portfolio)    0.03    0.03 
   (0.02)    (0.04) 
ln(size) x In-State    0.00    0.02 
   (0.01)    (0.05) 
ln(size) x Corruption Index    -0.16    -0.02 
   (0.08)*    (0.18) 
Constant -0.12  -0.34  0.11  -0.09 
 (0.04)***  (0.15)**  (0.10)  (0.22) 
R
2 0.00  0.00  0.00  0.00 
N  11076 11070  5819  5819 




Table 12: Public Pension Home-State Weighting and Performance, Pooled Across Years 
This table shows unadjusted public pension fund home-state weighting and performance statistics, pooled across 
years. The first column shows the in-state share of public pension fund PE investments. The second column shows 
the percent of PE investments in the state by out-of-state public pension LPs. The net IRR columns show the net 
IRR of different investments. The first net IRR column shows the net IRR of in-state public pension PE investments 
by in-state LPs. The second net IRR column shows the net IRR of out-of-state public pension PE investments by in-
state LPs. The third column shows the net IRR of public pension PE investments in the state by out-of-state LPs. 










Net IRR  Size of PE
LP in  LP out  LP in   Program 
GP in  GP in  GP out  $ bn 
CA 33.5  21.6  6.03 10.85 5.10  56.9
CO 7.3  0.8  5.01 -12.80 5.95  2.9
CT 13.7  5.7  4.40 9.96 12.95  1.4
DC 6.7  1.8  -32.20 -1.86 5.58  0.6
FL 0.8  0.6  12.90 2.37 1.13  4.4
ID 3.1  0.0  9.57 3.93 12.10  0.8
IL 21.2  6.8  -0.57 0.49 11.84  6.8
IN 3.4  0.0  -32.90 39.10 1.93  1.4
MA 44.2  13.7  2.24 11.33 10.86  5.9
MD 4.9  0.9  -10.15 -1.66 -2.60  1.4
MI 3.0  0.3  6.11 8.77 7.55  8.1
MN 12.1  0.6  -0.56 5.76 9.93  3.5
NC 12.9  0.4  -18.63 -8.62 -3.48  7.1
NH 1.8  0.1  9.80 9.89 4.73  0.1
NJ 3.0  1.6  -6.70 -0.80 -6.88  3.7
NY 40.1  25.5  2.40 5.53 -0.39  23.3
OH 20.7  0.6  3.35 1.52 0.26  7.5
OR 1.2  0.0  17.43 15.80 8.87  9.3
PA 15.5  0.9  0.49 -13.01 5.80  15.0
RI 8.1  0.9  14.89 8.26 4.32  0.6
TN 23.1  0.2  14.50 3.46 18.97  0.5
TX 16.9  5.5  -1.37 3.69 4.22  10.3
VA 2.6  0.7  -0.38 -1.56 16.50  4.4
WA 4.9  0.4  0.40 -3.69 9.30  13.7
WI 2.7  0.0  4.83 3.00 5.01  4.7
Avg 12.3  3.6  0.44 3.99 5.98 
Difference with LP(in)GP(in) 
Avg -3.6 -5.5 




Table 13: Public Pension Home-State Overweighting and Underperformance Relative to 
Vintage Means 
This table shows public pension fund home-state weighting and performance statistics using calculations that reflect 
the vintage (year) composition of investments. The first column shows the predicted in-state share of public pension 
fund PE investments, using 5-year rolling benchmarks. The second column shows the excess in-state share relative 
to the predicted share in the first column. The net IRR columns show the net IRR of different investments. The first 
net IRR column shows the net IRR of in-state public pension PE investments by in-state LPs, relative to vintage 
means. The second net IRR column shows the net IRR of out-of-state public pension PE investments by in-state 
LPs. The third column shows the net IRR of public pension PE investments in the state by out-of-state LPs. Only the 
25 states for which all variables could be calculated are shown. 
 
 
In-State Share  Net IRR - Vintage Mean  Size of PE 
5yr Rolling  LP in  LP out  LP in   Program 
Predicted  Excess  GP in  GP in  GP out  $ bn 
CA 23.7  9.1  -3.97 -0.37 0.24 56.9
CO 1.0  7.8  5.40 -5.13 -3.21 2.9
CT 9.1  4.0  -12.50 -0.46 0.29 1.4
DC 1.3  1.4  -15.29 0.45 -2.75 0.6
FL 1.0  0.3  9.82 0.12 -1.60  4.4
ID 0.0  3.0  0.00 0.00 1.45  0.8
IL 6.8  14.3  -1.87 0.81 1.88  6.8
IN 0.0  3.9  -2.55 0.00 2.82  1.4
MA 18.5  26.5  -10.69 0.44 0.91  5.9
MD 1.2  5.3  -17.91 0.35 -1.30 1.4
MI 0.2  2.1  -1.62 -0.14 -2.58 8.1
MN 0.6  10.8  -1.74 -0.78 -0.59 3.5
NC 0.5  15.5  1.27 -0.32 -2.31 7.1
NH 0.1  2.0  0.00 0.00 -11.36 0.1
NJ 1.4  0.9  1.86 -0.81 -0.08  3.7
NY 24.2  16.2  -1.62 0.20 -4.30 23.3
OH 1.1  25.3  -0.77 1.28 -1.47 7.5
OR 0.1  1.0  0.00 0.00 0.35 9.3
PA 1.0  16.6  1.39 -1.77 0.02  15.0
RI 0.8  6.4  -1.51 -0.24 -1.67  0.6
TN 0.2  27.7  0.00 0.00 8.63 0.5
TX 5.9  11.4  -5.98 -1.40 -0.99  10.3
VA 0.7  1.8  -0.25 -0.06 3.12 4.4
WA 0.7  4.2  0.29 3.06 -0.10  13.7
WI 0.0  2.7  0.00 0.00 -2.08 4.7
Avg 4.0  8.8  -2.33 -0.19 -0.67 




Table 14: Financial Effects of Overweighting and Underperformance for Public Pension 
Funds 
This table shows the financial effects of home-state overweighitng and underperformance for public pension funds. 
The left panel uses the investments by out-of-state LPs in the state as a benchmark, and the right panel uses the 
investments by state LPs outside of the state as a benchmark. Predicted and excess shares are based on the 5-year 
rolling benchmarks shown in Table 14. The first column is therefore the IRR difference between home-state 
investments and investments by out-of-state LPs in the state, times the predicted in-state share. The second column 
is the IRR difference between home-state investments and investments by out-of-state LPs in the state, times the 
excess in-state share. The third column is the sum of the first two columns. The right panel presents the analogous 
calculations for the benchmark of state LP investments outside of the state.  
 
All figures in $ millions per year 
Relative to Out-of-State LPs  
Investing in State 
Relative to In-State LPs  
Investing Out-of-State 
LP(in)GP(in) - LP(out)GP(in)  LP(in)GP(in) - LP(in)GP(out) 
Predicted Excess  Total  Predicted Excess  Total 
CA (485)  (186)  (670) (567) (217)  (784)
CO  3   24   27  2  19   22 
CT (15)  (7)  (22) (16) (7)  (24)
DC (1)  (1)  (3) (1) (1)  (2)
FL  4   1   5  5  2   6 
ID  0   0   0  (0) (0)  (0)
IL (12)  (26)  (38) (17) (36)  (54)
IN (0)  (1)  (1) (0) (3)  (3)
MA (121)  (173)  (294) (126) (180)  (306)
MD (3)  (13)  (16) (3) (12)  (15)
MI (0)  (2)  (3) 0  2    2 
MN (0)  (4)  (4) (0) (4)  (5)
NC  1   17   18  1  39   40 
NH  0   0   0  0  0   0 
NJ  1   1   2  1  1   2 
NY (103)  (69)  (171) 151 101    252 
OH (2)  (39)  (41) 1  13    14 
OR  0   0   0  (0) (0)  (0)
PA  5   78   83  2  34   36 
RI (0)  (0)  (1) 0  0    0 
TN  0   0   0  (0) (13)  (13)
TX (28)  (54)  (82) (30) (59)  (89)
VA (0)  (0)  (0) (1) (3)  (4)
WA (3)  (16)  (18) 0 2   3 
WI  0   0   0  0  3   3 






Table 15: Total Financial Effects as Share of Assets and Contributions 
This table present estimates of the financial effects of overweighting and underperformance as a share of total 
pension plans assets invested in private equity and as a share of annual contributions to the pension fund. The first 
column presents total pension plan PE assets by state. The second presents total annual contributions to pension 
plans by state. The second set of columns presents the annual financial effects due to the difference in the 
performance of in-state LPs on their in-state investments versus the performance of out-of-state LPs in the state. The 
right-most send of columns presents the annual financial effects due to the difference in the performance of state 
LPs on their in-state investments versus the performance of the same LPs out of state. 
 
Annual Loss: LP(in)GP(in) - 
LP(out)GP(in) 

















CA 56.89  14.90  (670.3)  -1.2%  -4.5%  (783.9)  -1.4%  -5.3% 
CO 2.88  1.38  26.5  0.9% 1.9%  21.7    0.8%  1.6% 
CT 1.41  1.60  (22.1)  -1.6%  -1.4%  (23.5)  -1.7% -1.5% 
DC 0.60  0.16  (2.5)  -0.4% -1.6%  (2.0)  -0.3%  -1.2% 
FL 4.38  3.37 5.3  0.1% 0.2%  6.3    0.1%  0.2% 
ID 0.78 0.47 0.0  0.0% 0.0%  (0.3)  0.0% -0.1% 
IL 6.75 5.17  (38.3)  -0.6%  -0.7%  (53.6)  -0.8% -1.0% 
IN 1.37 1.77  (1.4)  -0.1%  -0.1%  (2.9)  -0.2% -0.2% 
MA 5.87  2.38  (293.9)  -5.0%  -12.4%  (306.3)  -5.2% -12.9% 
MD 1.39  1.64  (16.4)  -1.2% -1.0%  (15.0)  -1.1%  -0.9% 
MI 8.07  1.74  (2.8)  0.0%  -0.2%  1.8    0.0%  0.1% 
MN 3.50  1.53  (3.8)  -0.1% -0.3%  (4.6)  -0.1%  -0.3% 
NC 7.07  1.94  18.0  0.3% 0.9%  40.5    0.6%  2.1% 
NH 0.06  0.34  0.0  0.0%  0.0%  0.1    0.2%  0.0% 
NJ 3.67 3.50 2.3  0.1% 0.1%  1.7    0.0%  0.0% 
NY 23.28  4.17  (171.3)  -0.7%  -4.1%  252.2    1.1%  6.0% 
OH 7.52  5.79  (40.8)  -0.5% -0.7%  13.9    0.2%  0.2% 
OR 9.26  0.66 0.0  0.0% 0.0%  (0.4)  0.0%  -0.1% 
PA 14.95  2.02 83.1  0.6%  4.1%  36.0    0.2%  1.8% 
RI 0.59 0.56  (0.5)  -0.1%  -0.1%  0.1    0.0%  0.0% 
TN 0.54  1.09 0.0  0.0% 0.0%  (13.0)  -2.4%  -1.2% 
TX 10.33  6.78  (81.7)  -0.8%  -1.2%  (89.0)  -0.9%  -1.3% 
VA 4.36  2.83  (0.2)  0.0%  0.0%  (3.7)  -0.1%  -0.1% 
WA 13.73  1.85 (18.4)  -0.1%  -1.0%  2.6    0.0%  0.1% 
WI 4.70  1.37 0.0  0.0% 0.0%  2.7    0.1%  0.2% 
Total  194   69   (1229.3)  -0.6%  -1.8%  (918.6)  -0.5%  -1.3% 52 
 
Figure 1: Performance of In-State and Out-of-State Investments in Terms of Net IRR, by LP Type 
This figure presents the performance of  in-state and out-of-state investments by LP type. T-statistics of statistical tests for the equality of in-state versus out of 
state performance are presented in the figure. The performance measure is net IRR adjusted by the mean net IRR of all investments in the sample that are made in 
the same state and vintage year. 53 
 
Figure 2: Performance of In-State and Out-of-State Investments in Terms of Net IRR, by LP Type 
This figure presents the performance of  in-state and out-of-state investments by LP type. T-statistics of statistical tests for the equality of in-state versus out of 
state performance are presented in the figure. The performance measure is net IRR adjusted by the mean net IRR of all investments in the sample that are made in 





Figure 3: Performance of In-State and Out-of-State Investments in Terms of Net IRR, by LP Type 
This figure presents the performance of  in-state and out-of-state investments by LP type. T-statistics of statistical tests for the equality of in-state versus out of 
state performance are presented in the figure. The performance measure is multiple of invested capital adjusted by the mean multiple of invested capital of all 






















t = 2.79 t = 0.31 t = ‐0.53 t = 0.22 t = ‐0.21 t = ‐1.4155 
 
 
Figure 4: Underperformance of In-State Public Pension PE Investments by Category 
The graph shows the relative performance of public pension PE investments in-state versus out-of-state by category, with a t-statistic for whether the 
performance is equal. Performance is measured as net IRR minus the mean of all other investments in the same vintage and GP state. T-statistics of statistical 
tests for the equality of in-state versus out of state performance are presented at the bottom of the figure. 
 56 
 
Appendix Table 1: Geographical Distribution of Investments 
This table presents the geographical distribution of sample PE investments, by the state where the fund is headquartered. Nine 
states without PE investments are not shown: AK, HI, KS, MS, MT, ND, NV, SD, and WV. The first set of columns gives the 
total number of investments. The second set gives the total number of PE investments in the state by out-of-state LPs. The third 
set gives the number of PE investments by in-state LPs. 
Total  by Out-of-State LPs  by In-State LPs 
number %  number %  number  % 
State(GP) (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) (6) 
AL 2  0.01% 2 0.01% 0  0.00%
AR 1  0.01% 0 0.00% 1  0.03%
AZ 1  0.01% 0 0.00% 1  0.03%
CA 4,865  25.84% 3,672 23.42% 1,193  37.87%
CO 187  0.99% 152 0.97% 35  1.11%
CT 1,307  6.94% 1,271 8.11% 36  1.14%
DC 280  1.49% 277 1.77% 3  0.10%
DE 3  0.02% 3 0.02% 0  0.00%
FL 140  0.74% 138 0.88% 2  0.06%
GA 38  0.20% 36 0.23% 2  0.06%
IA 10  0.05% 8 0.05% 2  0.06%
ID 7  0.04% 4 0.03% 3  0.10%
IL 1,358  7.21% 1,075 6.86% 283  8.98%
IN 27  0.14% 9 0.06% 18  0.57%
KY 4  0.02% 1 0.01% 3  0.10%
LA 2  0.01% 0 0.00% 2  0.06%
MA 3,182  16.90% 2,776 17.71% 406  12.89%
MD 175  0.93% 163 1.04% 12  0.38%
ME 5  0.03% 5 0.03% 0  0.00%
MI 55  0.29% 40 0.26% 15  0.48%
MN 148  0.79% 107 0.68% 41  1.30%
MO 18  0.10% 9 0.06% 9  0.29%
NC 89  0.47% 57 0.36% 32  1.02%
NE 8  0.04% 4 0.03% 4  0.13%
NH 10  0.05% 8 0.05% 2  0.06%
NJ 253  1.34% 245 1.56% 8  0.25%
NM 3  0.02% 2 0.01% 1  0.03%
NY 4,400  23.37% 3,853 24.58% 547  17.37%
OH 293  1.56% 172 1.10% 121  3.84%
OK 27  0.14% 27 0.17% 0  0.00%
OR 22  0.12% 15 0.10% 7  0.22%
PA 307  1.63% 163 1.04% 144  4.57%
RI 153  0.81% 142 0.91% 11  0.35%
SC 1  0.01% 0 0.00% 1  0.03%
TN 42  0.22% 36 0.23% 6  0.19%
TX 1,087  5.77% 938 5.98% 149  4.73%
UT 9  0.05% 7 0.04% 2  0.06%
VA 124  0.66% 117 0.75% 7  0.22%
VT 9  0.05% 9 0.06% 0  0.00%
WA 154  0.82% 129 0.82% 25  0.79%
WI 21  0.11% 5 0.03% 16  0.51%
WY 1  0.01% 1 0.01% 0  0.00%
Total 18,828  100.00% 15,678 100.00% 3,150  100.00%
Mean 1.96% 1.96% 1.96%
Median 0.10% 0.06% 0.10%57 
 
Appendix Table 2: Geographical Distribution of Investments by Capital Committed 
This table presents the geographical distribution of capital committed to PE investments, by the state where the fund is 
headquartered. Nine states without PE investments are not shown: AK, HI, KS, MS, MT, ND, NV, SD, and WV. Four states 
without known commitments are not shown: AL, AR, NM, and WY. The first set of columns gives the total dollar value of 
investments. The second set gives the total dollar value of PE investments in the state by out-of-state LPs. The third set gives the 
dollar value of PE investments by in-state LPs. 
  Total  by Out-of-State LPs  by In-State LPs 
Dollars Share  Dollars Share  number  % 
State(GP) (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6) 
AZ 22 0.0%  0 0.0% 22  0.0%
CA 97,541 19.6%  64,551 14.8% 32,990  54.4%
CO 3,114 0.6%  2,647 0.6% 467  0.8%
CT 28,943 5.8%  26,684 6.1% 2,259  3.7%
DC 16,103 3.2%  16,067 3.7% 35  0.1%
DE 13 0.0%  13 0.0% 0  0.0%
FL 1,258 0.3%  1,243 0.3% 15  0.0%
GA 528 0.1%  528 0.1% 0  0.0%
IA 389 0.1%  379 0.1% 10  0.0%
ID 60 0.0%  32 0.0% 28  0.0%
IL 22,395 4.5%  19,007 4.4% 3,388  5.6%
IN 161 0.0%  114 0.0% 47  0.1%
KY 24 0.0%  0 0.0% 24  0.0%
LA 11 0.0%  0 0.0% 11  0.0%
MA 50,952 10.3%  49,185 11.3% 1,767  2.9%
MD 2,714 0.5%  2,566 0.6% 148  0.2%
M E  40 . 0 %   40 . 0 % 0   0 . 0 %
MI 715 0.1%  490 0.1% 225  0.4%
MN 7,267 1.5%  6,148 1.4% 1,119  1.8%
MO 47 0.0%  35 0.0% 12  0.0%
NC 2,102 0.4%  1,397 0.3% 705  1.2%
NE 310 0.1%  290 0.1% 20  0.0%
NH 42 0.0%  28 0.0% 14  0.0%
NJ 6,023 1.2%  5,773 1.3% 250  0.4%
NY 189,079 38.1%  183,127 42.0% 5,952  9.8%
OH 3,228 0.6%  1,812 0.4% 1,416  2.3%
OK 141 0.0%  141 0.0% 0  0.0%
OR 791 0.2%  644 0.1% 147  0.2%
PA 8,081 1.6%  4,381 1.0% 3,700  6.1%
RI 7,469 1.5%  7,323 1.7% 146  0.2%
SC 20 0.0%  0 0.0% 20  0.0%
TN 194 0.0%  194 0.0% 0  0.0%
TX 42,502 8.6%  37,862 8.7% 4,640  7.6%
UT 50 0.0%  45 0.0% 5  0.0%
VA 2,923 0.6%  2,514 0.6% 409  0.7%
VT 130 0.0%  130 0.0% 0  0.0%
WA 1,181 0.2%  813 0.2% 368  0.6%
WI 390 0.1%  95 0.0% 295  0.5%
Total 496,917 100%  436,262 100% 60,654  100%
mean 2.56%  2.56% 2.56%




Appendix Table 3: Net IRR Differences, Weighted by Size of Commitment 
This table is analogous to a value-weighted version of Table 8. It shows t-tests of differences in net IRR 
between in-state and out-of-state investments, where the means are weighted by the size of the LP’s 
commitment. The left panel analyzes the raw IRR, and the right panel examines the IRR minus the mean 
of all other observations in the same state and vintage of the investment fund (the GP). For some LP 
types, including private pensions and private endowments the joint coverage of net IRR and LP 
commitment size would result in extremely small sample sizes, and hence these LP types are not shown. 
 
IRR  IRR Minus State x Vintage Mean 
Out of 
State In  State  Difference
Out of 
State In  State  Difference 
All  μ  2.23 -1.25 3.47 -0.89 -4.42  3.54
N 7390  1431 4.17 *** 7390 1431  5.78 ***
Public Pension  μ  2.15 -1.43 3.58 -0.92 -4.62  3.70
N 6643  1342 4.12 *** 6643 1342  5.82 ***
Endowment  μ  6.28 5.88 0.40 1.07 3.47  -2.40
N 688  75 0.12    688 75  0.83   
Public Endowment  μ  6.30 5.88 0.42 1.11 3.47  -2.36
N 673  75 0.12    673 75  0.81   
Foundation  μ  2.92 8.94 -6.02 0.14 -0.15  0.28
N 61  14 -1.04    61 14  0.08   
 
 